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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Stopping nuclear proliferation is at the top of the international agenda for years. With 182 signatures 
and 153 ratifications most states recognize the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as substantially 
inhibiting further vertical nuclear proliferation and in some extend halting the horizontal spread of 
nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the entry into force of the treaty is in limbo due to nine hold-out 
states - China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the United States. 
Why do they oppose it? Are there any windows of opportunity for the CTBT? The qualitative 
analysis distinguishes the inter-state, intra-state and decision-maker-level arguments. It is conducted 
in form of nine case studies and is primarily based upon official documents. Governmental 
statements rarely reveal full reasons for states’ reluctance concerning the CTBT, but outline 
necessary conditions for its success and provide a framework to work out policy approaches aiming 
at the treaties entry into force. The study points at a complex interrelation of technical reasons, 
security related arguments, arms-control related motivations and domestic policy issues. The most 
important findings to grapple with are seeking regionally comprehensive solutions and closing all 
outstanding loopholes accompanying the treaty. India and North Korea will be the toughest parties to 
sign and ratify the treaty, as there is either no interest in a treaty text as negotiated or no interest in 
banning nuclear testing at all, respectively. According to most hold-out states nuclear weapon states 
bear the highest responsibility for the treaty entry into force. 
 
This Working Paper is based on a master’s thesis submitted within the postgraduate course "Master 
of Peace and Security Studies – M.P.S." as a joint programme of the University of Hamburg and the 
Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH). The thesis has been submitted in July 2010. 
The time frame, thus, focuses primarily on the debate until July 2010 and only briefly indicates on 
current occurrences. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Problem diagnosis 
 
Fifteen years after the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature, 
13 states had not signed and 42 not ratified the treaty. While the treaty itself has to be seen as a 
success in terms of its international support, it nevertheless has not entered into force. According to 
the treaty text further nine states’ ratification is required for it to become legally binding. Those 
states of particular interest – China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and 
the United States – are an interestingly incoherent set. The hold-outs present a diverse group of states 
which already possess the status of an official NPT nuclear weapon state (China and United States), 
non-NPT states having nuclear weapons (Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea), a state suspected of 
having worked on nuclear weapons (Iran), and states without any indications for nuclear weapons as 
yet (Egypt, and also Indonesia for several decades now). Those differently motivated countries with 
varying standing within the international community “put a hold” on the CTBT, the conclusion of 
which has been designated at the 1995 NPT Extension and Review Conference as a legally binding 
obligation (Final Document 1995). It is noteworthy that the treaty has been signed by states that 
might be seen as the hold-outs’ counterparts. For example, China and United States still have not 
ratified the CTBT although other NPT nuclear-weapons states like France, Great Britain and Russia, 
have ratified it. 
The CTBT imposes an indefinite ban on all types of physical nuclear testing (apart from computer 
simulations and sub-critical tests). It is accompanied by a tight verification regime consisting of 337 
facilities around the world and is capable of detecting nuclear tests of even 0,1 kT TNT-equivalent 
with a high probability. The ban on testing restricts new nuclear weapons design development and is 
seen as an “essential pre-requisite to prevent horizontal and vertical proliferation” (Statement 2001). 
As the CTBT limits the ability of non-possessors to develop nuclear weapons, it would have an 
impact on horizontal proliferation (Preez 2010:7). As it constrains the development and qualitative 
improvement of new and more advanced warheads it would have an impact on vertical proliferation 
(Preez 2010:7).  
Observance of a complete ban also prevents a possibly significant public health hazard from regional 
and global spread of nuclear fallout. In practice atmospheric testing has been abandoned voluntarily 
by 125 states that are party to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, so this is more of a nominal than actual 
benefit. There have also been trace releases of radioactivity from underground nuclear explosives 
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testing since the CTBT was opened for signature. The public health impact of such releases is 
probably minimal compared to radiation exposures from steps in preparing nuclear explosives, but 
observance of a test ban could have an impact on both releases from underground testing and the 
overall scale of nuclear explosives manufacture. For a security study, it is the limitation that a test 
ban places on nuclear weapons design and manufacture rather than the effect on future radiation 
releases from nuclear explosive testing that is of principle interest.  
Taking into account the international debate on nuclear policies, a “Global Zero” picture arising at 
the horizon will hardly be possible without the CTBT entering into force. With President Obama’s 
famous Prague speech, hopes for a CTBT entering into force have been awakened again, at least in 
the pro-disarmament community.  
 
1.2. Research questions 
 
This research analysis aims to identify the motives for not signing or ratifying the CTBT by the nine 
outstanding hold-outs. This is the principle question addressed here. As the group in focus is very 
uneven in political, geographical and economic terms, tracing for an answer might either reveal a 
common ground for the hold-out states’ decisions, or explanations different case-by-case. 
Unfortunately, states are not very open in publicly laying down their reasons and motivations for 
their behavior. As there probably will not be any direct answer to the research question, it has to be 
derived from sub-questions. What is the utility of nuclear testing for states currently possessing 
nuclear weapons? Here potential motivations for further testing might be conclusive. And if the state 
does not even possess capabilities for testing yet, what would it need the nuclear weapons for? 
Would this utility implicate future testing? 
 
1.3. Political and scientific relevance  
 
There has not yet been any comprehensive study on the CTBT hold-out states. The most 
sophisticated works on the issue are the recent ”Report of Pugwash Consultation on CTBT Entry Into 
Force” (Cotta-Ramusino et.al. 2010) and an successively updated study by Jonathan Medalia 
(January 2010), who is a Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy in the U.S. Congressional Research 
Service. The Cotta-Ramusino Report gives a brief analysis of all hold-out cases, but lacks deep 
explanation within a historical context. Medalia gives an U.S.-oriented perspective that does not refer 
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to all hold-outs, leaving the analysis without any comments on Egypt, Indonesia, Iran or Israel. The 
studies are focused on giving policy advice and serving as background information for decision-
makers, and do not analyze the research object within a theory of international relations. The value 
added of the present work is an examination of motives using a structured analysis based on theories 
of international relations. The definition of causal phenomenon will outline conditions under which 
the hold-outs will vote in favor of CTBT, thus providing insight on incentives on further approaches 
to achieving CTBT ratification. 
 
1.4. Theoretical approach 
 
Due to the broad range of cases discussed, it is difficult to find a simple and generally applicable 
theory. In order to overcome this problem in a structured manner, the study uses a threefold “level of 
analysis” approach (c.f. Singer 1961) and looks at every state actor from the inter-state, intra-state 
(state) and individual level perspectives. However, this does not mean that all levels will be 
examined in comparable detail in all cases. Thus, only those analysis levels will be discussed which 
are important for each state. The theoretical framework has been significantly influenced by the 
analytical approach of Saira Khan (Khan 2002: 12-30). Khan conducted a study on the causal 
phenomena of states involved in protracted conflicts that seek or already acquired nuclear weapons.  
The inter-state level refers to the almost anarchical system of international relations between states 
and is based on explanations from a Realist theoretical perspective (Khan 2002:12-13). Putting 
Khans ideas upon our case, a CTBT veto might be explained as a means to preserve the states’ 
military options through keeping the testing option open and when testing - vicariously gain 
international recognition and prestige, allusively achieve the status of a regional hegemony, obtain 
favorable bargaining capability (c.f. Epstein 1977), or some mixture of these motivations. 
The leitmotif of securing the states’ existence through the development of a nuclear deterrent is one 
possible reason for keeping a nuclear weapons option open, for states surrounded by nuclear or 
conventionally better off neighbors, who pose a (subjective) threat to the state. By keeping the 
nuclear option open, a state shows its possible nuclear capability or just does not want to close the 
option for potential testing. As possession of nuclear weapons became an obvious feature of global 
powers, in less extreme security threat situations testing can be aimed at least in part at gaining 
international recognition and prestige by presenting nuclear capability. In this context it is worth 
noticing that the norm system has changed through the NPT regime and the possession or testing of 
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nuclear weapons is being more and more disregarded by the world community in terms of human 
responsibility (Dhanapala 1999: 2). Furthermore, testing of nuclear weapons might be used to 
intimidate weaker states in the pursuit of regional hegemonic status. This is due to the perception that 
showing nuclear capabilities can be a mode of deterrence not only of a massive attack by another 
state, but also of less extreme actions that can be deterred by the hint of a threat of use of nuclear 
weapons [Khan 2002: 14]. Beyond that, states may be in favor of the CTBTs purpose and objectives, 
but use their veto right to bargain a change in relations with other states, gain recognition of a 
regional conflict by the world community, negotiate economic help or a faster disarmament process. 
Those motivations can be correlated with the realist approach. With the pessimistic view on human 
nature, realists conclude that in the absence of a central controlling instance at the self-help 
international system, actors are faced with a security dilemma (c.f. Morgenthau et al. 2006; Knapp 
et.al. 2004). Trying to achieve a “balance of power”, they improve their security, while their actions 
increase the insecurity of other actors and thus a vicious circle emerges (c.f. Sheehan 1996). This 
increase is being determined by military power accumulation, from which nuclear power serves as 
the most effective mean. 
Ad vocem intra-state (state) level motivations, they mostly refer to domestic incentives [Khan 
2002:17] and bureaucratic politics [Khan 2002:19]. Forwarding Khans’ idea these can include 
military and public opinion influence, internal lobbies for development of scientific and 
technological capabilities, and economic factors. Domestic politics refers to possible intra-state 
upheavals, which lead the state leader to shift internal public attention to international affairs [Khan 
2002: 17], for example through a nuclear test. This presentation of power may be also focused on the 
citizens themselves in order to either intimidate the turmoil leaders or bolster public support for the 
government. Changes within the political scene may also trigger a state’s withdrawal from or 
increased interest in nuclear testing. The state’s bureaucratic politics is a “key domestic variable in 
the complex decision-making surrounding nuclear choices” (Campbell 2004: 24). Public opinion also 
might be a factor influencing a state’s decision on testing nuclear weapons. The technological-
scientific issue indicates the acquisition of the knowledge needed for testing and the willingness to 
demonstrate success. The economic issue refers to a situation when expenditure costs of 
conventional armament exceed the potential costs of nuclear weaponry and thus the second may be 
considered as a cheaper option, thus creating an incentive for developing and testing (Khan 2002: 
18).  
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State level motivations leading towards nuclear weapons and/or to subsequent nuclear testing match 
with the neoclassical realist theory and liberalism. One version of neoclassical realism assumes that 
leaving domestic affairs out of the judgment of state behavior within the intra-state frame is a 
mistake. States are incoherent, and their external policy is determined by internal factors including 
“social fragmentation”, “government or regime vulnerability”, “elite fragmentation”, “elites’ 
preferences and perceptions of the external environment”, “domestic political risk associated with 
certain foreign policy choices” etc. (Schweller 2004: 169-170). This level of intra-state analysis can 
also be found in some versions of liberalism, as it values individual actors as being “rational, ethical 
and moral creatures capable of controlling their basic impulses” (Shimko 2005: 51.). Summing up, 
both theories can “explore the ‘internal processes’ by which states ‘arrive at policies and decide on 
actions’ in response to the pressures and opportunities in their external environment” (Schweller 
2003: 320). 
The individual actor level refers to the peculiarities of individual decision makers, which directly 
influence foreign affairs and security related decisions. In the case of the research object examined 
here, however, the sole beliefs and attitudes of one leader often do not appreciably influence the final 
outcome, given the long lead time needed for developing nuclear weapons. Decisions on going 
nuclear might be made by a strong leader with high authority, but testing of nuclear weapons 
involves many actors, who often influence the decision making process. This is why any case to be 
described at this level here, although it is understood that in some cases the attitudes of particular 
influential individuals could have some impact on decisions on whether a country decides it wants to 
conduct a nuclear weapons test. 
 
1.5. Methodology 
 
The present work uses comparative foreign policy analysis method (c.f. Stahl 2006). Taking the 
political, geographical and economic differences of the hold-out states into account, the hypothesis 
examined here is that each of the states’ reasoning is driven by factors peculiar to its own situation. 
This suggests first looking at all state-cases one-by-one before trying to come to a conclusion on the 
coherence of the overall argumentation against CTBT. Nine different state-cases will be examined in 
order to search for possible commonality in the explanation of their CTBT rejection. Moreover, two 
empirical methods are used: assessment of primary and secondary sources (c.f. Behnke et.al.2006) as 
well as interviews. Primary sources refer to states’ official statements on the research objective. 
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Secondary sources contribute additional insights from scientists and experts. Interviewed were state 
officials and experts. Every state-case description has an introductory part, followed by the level 
analysis and a summary. The introduction briefly outlines what is going to be described, i.e. which 
questions are to be answered in this particular case. It will also provide basic information on the 
states’ current attitude towards the treaty. Afterwards, the reasons for the CTBT rejection will be 
examined. As previously mentioned, only those analysis levels will be described that suit each 
particular case. Every case is going to describe the states’ perception of its security environment and 
present subjective state arguments on why it is opposing the CTBT. At the end of each case study, a 
brief summary will outline the most important outcomes from the research. A critical and 
comparative analysis of the findings will be discussed in chapter IV.  
 
1.6. Sources 
 
Literature used in the study consists of primary statements from the Conference on Facilitating the 
Entry into Force of CTBT as well as transcripts, unclassified hearings referring to the subject matter, 
and governmental statements. Secondary literature comprises articles written by diplomats, who took 
part in the CTBT negotiations representing a hold-out state (like Ms. Ghose representing India; Ms. 
Zou Yunhua representing China), as well as other articles and books on the hold-out states politics 
written by experts and scientists etc. However, it has to be emphasized that the hold-outs differ in 
their openness in revealing information. There is plenty of publicly available information concerning 
the United States, while the opposite is the case for North Korea. Several unclassified Congressional 
hearings, Congressional Research Service reports and analyses on the American case made it easy to 
undertake U.S.-related research on the subject. North Korea does not even mention the CTBT in its 
statements. Furthermore, most secondary literature on the DPRK is based upon intelligence and 
predictions, thus presenting a different value as source of reliable information. Additionally, a few 
interviews have been conducted – mostly during the 2010 NPT Review Conference in New York. 
They served as basic information providers, giving incentives for further research.  
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CHAPTER 2. CTBT CURRENT LIMBO STATUS 
 
2.1. CTBT – what is it? 
 
The main aim of the CTBT is that state party members “undertake not to carry out any nuclear 
weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion” (CTBT art. I). This means that after its entry 
into force even underground nuclear explosions, allowed by the Partial Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(PTBT), will be prohibited. As testing is needed for sophisticated modernization of existing 
stockpiles or the development of new nuclear devices, the CTBT would substantially inhibit further 
vertical nuclear proliferation. Universal observance of the CTBT probably would not fully stop the 
horizontal spread of nuclear weapons directly, as the implosion type device can be built by a non-
weapon state and used without being tested due to the relatively “simple” design.  
The idea of a CTBT was proposed in the 1950s by India and Japan simultaneously (Johnson 2009: 
2). As a first successful formal treaty step, the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) entered into force in 
1963. It indefinitely prohibits nuclear weapons tests or any other nuclear explosion in the 
atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. It does not ban underground testing as such, but does 
prohibit explosions that cause "radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the 
State under whose jurisdiction or control" the test was conducted (PTBT Art. I par.1b). The decision 
to start broad international negotiations of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was the 
consensus test ban resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1992. The step has 
been made due to several unilateral testing moratoria, resulting from the end of the Cold War, that 
improved the international cooperation ambience as well as a result of continuous pressure 
demanding a CTBT during previous NPT Review Conferences (particularly in 1985 and 1990). 
Negotiations were held at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva starting on January 25, 
1994. As India blocked the consensus required for reporting the text of the CTBT out of the CD, 
Australia bypassed the CD by taking the text directly back to the United Nations. The treaty was 
opened for signature in New York on September 24, 1996. The final document of the 2000 NPT 
Review Conference made the CTBT entry into force a legally binding obligation for states parties to 
the NPT. States not party to the NPT were also encouraged to ratify the CTBT. 
A Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization was 
established to prepare to implement the treaty and to supervise the International Monitoring System 
(IMS), composed of 337 international verification facilities as of 2010. After the entry into force a 
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Conference of the States Parties (the principal organ to consider any questions or issues within the 
treaty per CTBT art. II B24) and an Executive Council (the executive body of the treaty per CTBT 
art. II C37-38) will be created. Important for further reading is to understand the composition of the 
latter. The Executive Council will be a body consisting of 51 members representing six geographical 
entities (1) Africa, (2) Eastern Europe, (3) Latin America and the Caribbean, (4) Middle East and 
South Asia, (5) North America and Western Europe, and (6) South East Asia, the Pacific and the Far 
East. The problem is that these groupings consist of states that do not necessarily recognize each 
other’s right to sovereignty, like the Iran-Israel case within the Middle East grouping. If this situation 
persists it might make the operations of the Executive body very difficult. However, a necessary 
condition for the CTBT to enter into force may be a considerable easing of tensions involving 
countries that have nuclear weapons and other countries in their region. 
 
2.2. Status of the treaty 
 
After opening for signatures, the treaty collected 182 signatures and 153 ratifications as for July 15, 
2010. However, its entry into force is conditioned by Article XIV, which requires ratification of all 
states listed in Annex 2 to the treaty. The list consists of 44 names and refers to states with nuclear 
capability at the time of the treaty negotiation (see Annex 1). Today we face a situation in which 
three Annex 2 governments did not sign or ratify the treaty (India, North Korea, Pakistan) and six 
Annex 2 states that have signed but not ratified it (China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel and United 
States).  
The entry into force clause had to ensure that all state parties with nuclear potential will agree to the 
treaties purpose and obligation, and was an outcome of tough negotiations. An interesting idea of 
how the clause shall be interpreted has been presented by a member of the Permanent Representation 
of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament (Interview 2010). He sees 
the entry into force clause as a security guarantee for all state parties, a parallel to the “trust” 
principle. Like on the housing market, the “deal” will not run unless the buyer gives “earnest” 
money, and the seller becomes legally obligated to complete the transaction by giving the keys to the 
commodity to the “trustee”. Only when both parties fulfill their transactional obligations, the 
“trustee” gives the money to the seller as part of the purchase settlement, and the trustee gives the 
keys to the buyer. The “trust” principle has to make sure that the transaction is safe for both sides, so 
that no party can escape without exchanging its “deal instrument”. The CTBT entry into force shall 
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be seen in the same way. According to Annex 2, 44 states have to deposit their ratification 
instruments at the “depositary” in order for the treaty to enter into force. The ratification of the 
CTBT presents the “deal”. As such, the parties can be understood as being the buyers and sellers, 
while the “depositary” plays the role of the “trustee”. This theory is build upon the premise that 
states do not trust each other and are afraid of the consequences of their ratification in case other 
states will not join the CTBT club. The entry into force clause responds exactly to this fear. 
Therefore, the treaty provisions are not legally binding unless the treaty enters into force – also for 
states that already ratified it.  
It is a bit more complicated with states that did not even sign the CTBT. Signing a treaty is giving a 
signal to the world community that a country supports the principles and objectives of a treaty. 
According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 18 “[a] state is obliged to refrain 
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty” (Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties 1969), already when it has signed, ratified or expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty. 
States that reject signing, have to be seen as opposing the idea of the treaty. It might be a signal of 
disappointment with the negotiated treaty text or a signal of potential upcoming nuclear weapons 
programs and subsequent testing. Those state parties will be the toughest to convince.  
The clause also has a side-effect. Most of the listed states probably would not like to be responsible 
for holding CTBT ratification in limbo. They also fear international isolation. Therefore, the clause 
puts pressure on them as the whole international community watches them and judges according to 
their behavior. Thus further ratification by some may accelerate ratification by others.  
At present the CTBTO works towards operational treaty timeliness, meeting the treaties requirements 
(Interview 2010a). For example, the United Nations Security Council Resolutions after both North 
Korean nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 relied on data provided by the IMS. However, the entry into 
force of the CTBT foresees that the”verification regime shall be capable of meeting the verification 
requirements of this treaty” (CTBT art. IV A1). As for today, the verification regimes operational 
readiness is being assumed to be at the level of 83%. (Interview 2010a). The CTBT entry into force 
will bring important changes: the Executive Council starts working and on-site inspections will be 
possible. 
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2.3. Article XIV Conference 
 
The Article XIV Conference, the official name of which is the Conference on Facilitating the Entry 
into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, is a meeting held every two years by the 
treaties member states. It is held once in Vienna and another time in New York. Its aim is to work 
towards an early entry into force of the treaty (CTBT art. XIV par. 2.). Only member states, which 
ratified the treaty, can actively participate. States that did not ratify, NGOs and special agencies take 
part with an observer status.  
Member states present their statements and try to achieve a final document with suggestions on how 
to encourage the hold-out states to become members with ratification. The document underlines the 
assurance of the CTBT signatories and ratifiers to pursue general and complete disarmament under 
strict and effective international control. Measures that promote the treaty include e.g. selecting 
coordinators to enhance cooperation through informal consultations with all interested countries, 
aimed at promoting further signatures and ratifications; maintain a contact list of countries among 
ratifiers which volunteer to assist the coordinators in various regions; organizing workshops, 
seminars and training programmes in the legal and technical fields; and close cooperation with non-
governmental bodies to raise awareness on the treaty. All activities undertaken by signatory and 
ratifying states in the previous year to assist in promoting the goal are presented in a report. 
The hold-out states can present their position papers and thus explain their viewpoint on the CTBT. 
Position papers often explicitly address concerns towards the impact a CTBT might have on their 
security. Most of the hold-out states use this possibility to express conditions under which they might 
consider ratifying the treaty.  
To date six Article XIV Conferences took place (1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009). The 
conference serves as a barometer for CTBT support. Hold-out state’s attendance gives a clue on the 
importance their current governments attach to the treaty. China, Egypt, Israel and Iran took part in 
every conference. Indonesia failed to attend once in 2005, probably due to be preoccupied with the 
2004 devastating Indian Ocean earthquake. Pakistan attends every two years – in 1999, 2003 and 
2007. The Bush Administration did not send any representatives to the conference, thus the United 
States attended twice – in 1999 and 2007. India and North Korea never took part in the conference.  
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CHAPTER 3. CASE STUDIES - FINDING OUT STATES MOTIVES 
 
3.1. China 
 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a NPT nuclear weapon state that signed the CTBT, but did 
not ratify it yet. According to official Article XIV Conference statements, the treaty has been 
submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (Statement 2005 and 2007) 
for ratification in early 2000 (Gill 2010: 11). To deal with ratification, a preparatory office has been 
established at the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General Armaments Department (China’s 
National Defense in 2006). China continuously reiterates its support for the CTBT principles and 
objectives (China’s National Defense in 2008). As the PRC is a nuclear weapons state, its reasons for 
keeping open the possibility of further testing has to be examined. 
 
Inter-state level 
The Chinese security perception is shaped by its geostrategic position, historical experience, growing 
technological and economic capabilities and its cultural footprints (Swaine 1999). “Historically, 
China’s stated purpose for developing nuclear weapons was to guard itself against nuclear coercion 
and blackmail” argues Hui Zhang, a physicist and specialist in Chinese nuclear policy issues from 
the Harvard University (Zhang 2010: 140). Zhang argues that the PRC is a “responsible power” 
dealing with its “peaceful rise” (Shirk 2008: 107-108): an extreme economic growth, step-by-step 
becoming a power in the Asian-Pacific region and aspiring to become the world’s leading economy. 
It is protective of its national sovereignty and lives the words of Deng Xiaoping that “only with a 
peaceful environment can [economic] development be accomplished smoothly” (Zhu 1997: 44). 
According to the Chinese thinking, this condition is being secured by its nuclear capability. A 
stronger argument, however, is that the government in Beijing claims on neighboring territories, a 
reference to Taiwan, and wants to be prepared to defend its possession. While in principle the PRC 
has not ruled out the use of force to impose its administration on Taiwan, in practice the PCR slogan 
of “one country, two systems” has meant simply dissuading Taiwan from declaring independence. 
Another factor is the perceived threat of a possible interference of another power into Chinese 
politics. This mainly reflects a concern about the United States. Based on the doctrinal text “China’s 
National Defense and World Military Affairs” published 1999, General Zhang Wannian, Chief of the 
General Staff Department of the PLA, argued that “forces of hegemony in the world will use nuclear 
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weapons to dominate other nations” (Wortzel 2007: 5). This perception did not change over time and 
is still visible in official documents: “[T]he United States is accelerating its realignment of military 
deployment to enhance its military capability in the Asia-Pacific region” (China’s National Defence 
in 2006). The topic also appeared at the CTBT negotiation table, with Sha Zukang, serving as 
Chinese Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), reiterating  concerns about 
“hegemonic ambitions [of other states] and the habit of interfering with other countries’ international 
affairs” (Statement 1996b). Having nuclear weapons is apparently seen in China as validating its 
great power status and securing its territorial policy.  
Taken from the statement upon Chinese signature of the CTBT, Beijing appeals for abandoning 
nuclear deterrence policies. It calls for nuclear stockpiles reductions by the biggest nuclear powers, 
withdrawing nuclear weapons from foreign soil, refraining from first-use-policy, and no use or threat 
of use of nuclear weapons against no-nuclear weapons states (Statement 1996a). In the statements 
given at the Conference Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, Beijing reiterates the need to 
“establish a new international security concept centering on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and 
cooperation” (Statement 2001a, 2003, 2005 and 2007). China also calls for a prompt nuclear 
disarmament process (Statement 2007) and for countries to “refrain from researching into and 
developing new types of nuclear weapons, further reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, lower the 
status of such weapons in national security strategy and unconditionally undertake not to use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons” (Statement 2005). Moreover, China favors an international legal 
instrument aimed at the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons (Zhang 2010: 146). Beijing 
plays these cards of demand at the table in order to press for a “new nuclear security order” build 
upon conditions described above. 
 
State level 
Although the PRC restates its commitment to its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing from 1996, 
its 44 test explosions is the lowest number amongst NPT nuclear weapons states (see Annex 2). 
According to Senior Colonel Zou Yunhua, Arms Control Program Coordinator at the PLA Foreign 
Affairs Bureau at the General Armaments Department who served as a negotiator and expert on the 
Chinese delegation at the CTBT negotiation table, “the CTBT negotiations caught China in the 
middle of its nuclear weapons program, whereas the United States, Russia, and Britain had 
completed several development cycles” (Yunhua 1998: 4). Beijing used the last moment before 
finalizing the CTBT negotiations and conducted eight nuclear explosions; although apparently it has 
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never aspired to match the quantity or complete level of refinement in quality achieved by other 
nuclear weapon states (Yunhua 1998: 5). Moreover, it currently “is in the midst of a significant 
modernization program for its nuclear force, particularly its means of delivery” (Gill 2010: 4). “From 
a purely technical perspective, China needs to conduct more nuclear tests” (Yunhua 1998: 26). 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Director Bates Gill notes though that 
Chinese economic development allowed huge investments in the past decade in up-grading and 
improving its outdated nuclear arsenal (Gill 2010: 4). Moreover, it currently “is in the midst of a 
significant modernization program for its nuclear force, particularly its means of delivery” (Gill 
2010: 4). According to Pugwash member PLA Major General Pan Zhenqiang, China is extremely 
concerned about U.S. reticence on the CTBT, as it still perceives threats from that “superpower” 
(Zhenqiang 2009: 33), especially in light of U.S. missile defense plans. The Director of the Newly 
Independent States Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies predicts that those fears could make Chinese ratification of the CTBT problematic in case its 
nuclear experts decide that PRC needs “maneuvering warhead to evade missile defence interceptors” 
and thus will need testing of lighter weight and thus redesigned warheads (Hansell et.al. 2009: 143). 
 
Summary 
The explanation for China’s reluctance on CTBT ratification might be found at the inter-state and 
state levels. Unless Beijing’s “biggest threat” makes improbable changes and modernization in its 
stockpiles, making Chinese weapons obsolete, China probably will not test further. Of all the NPT 
nuclear weapons states, it has the most modest intercontinental nuclear arsenal and limited testing 
program, thus it does not want unilaterally close any options for further nuclear developments of its 
stockpiles. Chinese CTBT policy seems to be U.S.-reactive. A glimpse of hope might thus occur with 
Washington ratifying the CTBT as an incentive for Beijing to follow (Zhang 2010: 148). There are 
predictions that China has already ratified the CTBT and only waits for the United States to do the 
same before submitting ratification instruments to the depositary (Interview 2010b). By doing this it 
might be living Deng Xiaoping’s famous maxim “[h]ide our capacities and bide our time, but also 
get some things done” (Shirk 2008: 105). 
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3.2. Egypt 
 
Cairo signed the CTBT, but did not ratify it yet. As a NPT non-nuclear weapons state, Egypt 
supports, according to what it claims at the Article XIV Conference, the principles and objectives of 
the CTBT (Statement 2005a). While pledging for nuclear disarmament, the government in Cairo is 
being influenced by the unstable security situation in the Middle East and uses the treaty as a 
bargaining instrument to finally achieve the long promised Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone 
(ME NWFZ). Therefore, based on its consequent policy line, an assumption can be made that an 
important reason for Egypt rejecting the CTBT ratification is to bargain for a nuclear weapons free 
zone in the region due to its concerns about the ambiguous Israeli case and Iran’s nuclear intentions. 
 
Inter-state level 
Egypt demands a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. The idea is not new and was mentioned 
by Egypt already in the 1970s. This project is being driven by two potential threats to regional 
stability: Israel and Iran. According to James Leonard, a former American Deputy Special 
Representative for Middle East peace negotiations, in terms of security concerns Cairo mostly 
struggles with Israel’s clandestine nuclear weapons, claiming their destructive influence on the 
regional security environment and creating global inequality within the non-proliferation regime 
(Leonard 1995: 2).  
 
“This concern appears to have two aspects. One is fear that if another war were to break out, even 
one that did not involve Egypt, the possible use by Israel of nuclear weapons elsewhere would 
create a situation that could not fail to affect Egypt. The second concern relates, not to any Israeli 
use of a nuclear weapon, but rather to the likelihood that the indefinite retention by Israel of its 
nuclear capability, however ambiguous, will lead some other country in the region to ‘go nuclear’ 
with grave damage to Egypt’s security situation” (Leonard 1995: 2). 
 
This perception is also indirectly visible in Egyptian statements to the Conference on Disarmament 
(CD Statement 2007, 2009a). Thus its nuclear agenda’s primary aim is to eliminate all security 
asymmetry, “gradually conditioning all progress on Israel’s accession to the NPT” (Horovitz 2010: 
11). The canvas for the Arab-Israeli conflict lies much deeper and refers to territorial disputes over 
the Sinai Peninsula dating back to the creation of the state of Israel (Khan 2002: 248). Although 
Jerusalem withdrew from the Egyptian territory after the 1979 Camp David Peace Accords (except 
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for Gaza, which Egypt does not want back), hostility towards a nuclear Israel remained. As long as 
Israel will not enter into internationally binding obligations concerning nuclear weapons, Egypt will 
also restrain itself from doing so. Cairo leads a coherent and consequent policy in that matter and 
rejects membership in other treaties, like the Biological Weapons Convention or the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, unless Israel will join the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapons state. This is also 
due to balancing Israeli power by keeping chemical stockpiles. However, Cairo is a signatory state of 
the Pelindaba Treaty and within its Article 5 it supports - in good will - the principles and objectives 
of the treaty and refrains from testing of nuclear explosive devices (Pelindaba Treaty 1996). In 
principle this clearly indicates its positive attitude towards the CTBT idea. The Egyptian NPT 
ratification in 1981 has been only possible due to the finished territorial conflict with Israel and was a 
step aimed at better international relations with the United States in particular, shedding a light onto 
Israel’s refusal, and the desire to develop civil nuclear energy, which would be difficult to achieve 
indigenously. Apparently a “U.S. promise that Israel would sign it as well” (Khan 2002: 257) was 
also in the game. As Israel still did not join the NPT regime, as a precaution Cairo will probably wait 
for Israel to ratify the CTBT first. According to Mahmoud Karem, the Egyptian Ambassador to the 
EU, “[p]eace has to be through equality. Peace should not allow any party to practice hegemony. [...] 
Any security with weapons of mass destruction is not acceptable” (Khan 2002: 256) – clear reference 
to Israel. Iran is another security concern for Egypt, mostly connected with the fear of taking over 
Cairo’s previous attempts at  regional hegemony, reinforcement of destabilizing revisionist impulses 
from a nuclear Iran and increased potential for military conflicts provoked by Iran’s nuclear 
aspirations (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2008: 29). Noteworthy, the political and 
scientific milieus are divided on that matter, with the government in Cairo reestablishing diplomatic 
relations with Iran in 2008 (after a break of almost three decades). Today Cairo has changed its 
rhetoric, claiming that the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East would “open 
the doors for a new horizon to the CTBT” (Statement 2009). It seems that Egypt seeks a 
comprehensive and durable regional security order. A regional nuclear weapons free zone could 
involve Iran accepting the IAEA Additional Protocol and the accompanying tight safeguards and a 
monitoring system. For Israel it would mean disclosing its nuclear capabilities in terms of weapons 
and facilities, and the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons. The outcome of the 2010 NPT Review 
Conference might be seen as a light in the tunnel in terms of the ME NWFZ. The final document 
calls for an initial conference in 2012 to discuss the potential implementation of such a zone (Final 
Document 1995). According to Ambassador Abdel Aziz, head of the Egyptian delegation at the 2010 
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NPT Review Conference, it is a modest step that requires an extensive “follow-up mechanism”, but 
is seen as a promising starting point (Grossman 2010). Another issue will be to persuade Israel and 
Iran to sit at one table, and Israel to appear at all, after it has been mentioned by name in the final 
declaration and called to join the regime (Final Document 2010). 
In order to push the ME NWFZ case forward, Cairo took a more offensive course. It reopened its 
nuclear option once again and changed its rhetoric to gain more leverage in negotiations. On the 28th 
May, just after the 2010 NPT Review Conference in New York Abdel Aziz stated in an interview 
that ”an Iranian bomb would prompt Egypt to pull out of the nonproliferation accord and acquire its 
own nuclear deterrent” (Grossmann 2010). According to Grossmann, however, this appears to be 
“the impression Cairo seeks to give.” Egypt does not want to just “wait and see” what happens in 
terms of the ME NWFZ. After almost half a century, it wants some concrete activities aimed at 
meeting that goal. Egypt already held a nuclear option open in the 1960s (under the rule of President 
Gamal Abdel Nasser 1954-1970), when it also tried to acquire nuclear weapons directly from China 
and Russia, but it did not develop any significant nuclear capabilities, apart from two nuclear 
research reactors. In September 2006 Cairo proudly announced that it would “revive long-dormant 
plans for nuclear power” (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2008: 17). Ambassador Aziz 
send a warning signal by saying that “if others will acquire nuclear weapons, and if others are going 
to use these nuclear weapons to acquire status in the region of the Middle East, let me tell you, we 
are not going to accept to be second-class citizens in the region of the Middle East” (Grossman 
2010). Thus today, by reopening its nuclear option, Cairo tries to put pressure on the international 
community to accelerate the drive for the ME NWFZ.  
 
State level 
It is hard to estimate the current domestic situation in Egypt due to the 2011 uprising. From February 
2011 the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces forms an interim cabinet. A new government will be 
formed after the September 2011 parliamentary elections as well as the October/November 
2011presidential elections. Already for a longer time Egypt has been struggling with domestic 
security problems concerning the turmoil after the 2005 election campaign, governmental repression 
and growing internal Islamic challenges to the secularly oriented leadership (International Institute 
for Strategic Studies 2008: 17). The political transition underway in Egypt implies political 
instability, not the most propitious time to consider a treaty of this importance. As the country’s 
CTBT Hold-out States.  
Why did „the longest sought, hardest fought prize in arms control history” still not enter into force? 
 
17 
 
political attention towards nuclear programs is being characterized as “inconsistent” (International 
Institute for Strategic Studies 2008: 23), some suspicions on its nuclear activities are not surprising.  
 
Summary 
Nevertheless the changing political scene, Cairo will probably try to stay a non-proliferation player 
and stick to its previous position on CTBT. It seems to put everything onto one card: the Middle East 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. However, as Egypt already committed itself to restrain from nuclear 
testing by accessing the Pelindaba Treaty, it could delink CTBT from the ME NWFZ and thus set an 
example on regional leadership in non-proliferation. 
 
3.3. India 
 
The “father” state of the CTBT did not yet even sign it. India does not seem willing to consider the 
treaty text in its current formulation. Instead, New Delhi consistently claims that only when the 
international community will take a serious move towards a time-framed complete nuclear 
disarmament, it will consider becoming member. Especially as India is a not a NPT nuclear weapon 
state, the potential need and utility for further testing by India has to be evaluated. 
 
Inter-state level 
India is the originator at the state level of the nuclear test ban idea, as it laid down in four proposals 
on that matter (Jawaharlal Nehru in 1945, Morarji Desai in 1978, Rajiv Gandhi in 1982 and 1988). 
By rejecting the CTBT, India wants to safeguard its nuclear option. In order to assess the motives 
behind India’s reluctant position towards the CTBT, understanding of New Delhi’s argumentation 
within the treaty negotiations debate is illuminating. Upon entering CD negotiations in 1994, India 
had two demands. First, it wanted the CTBT to ban all nuclear tests and second, linking it to the 
complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework. Banning all nuclear tests 
meant that any qualitative improvement or modernizing of existing weapons would be difficult. 
However, India was concerned that tight restrictions on activities other than explosives using 
fissionable material might be needed: 
 
“As the PTBT drove testing underground, we do not wish the CTBT to drive testing into 
laboratories by those who have the resources to do so. We must ensure that the CTBT leaves no 
loophole for activity, either explosive based or non-explosive based, aimed at the continued 
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development and refinement of nuclear weapons....The situation would be untenable where even 
with a CTBT in place, development, refinement and production of new nuclear weapons continues” 
(Ghose 1995: 253). 
 
The second concern expressed by India referred to the need to put the CTBT within a time frame for 
nuclear disarmament. Arundathi  Ghose, who served as Ambassador/Permanent Representative of 
India to the United Nations in Geneva and participated in CTBT negotiations, underlines that India 
negotiated the CTBT with the presumption that “banning of all testing would lead to their 
obsolescence and eventual elimination by preventing the qualitative development of the weapons” 
(Ghose 1995: 5). Negotiation parties did not respond to India’s demands, which lead India to conduct 
its nuclear tests in 1998 once a party with nuclear testing on its agenda came to power. As former 
Prime Minister Vajpayee mentioned, “[i]n fact, had their response been positive, we need not have 
gone in for our current testing program” (Statement 1998). This unserious treatment of India’s 
demands has been the reason for India to reject the treaty. Already during negotiations, Ghose made 
clear that  
 
“[t]he CTBT that we see emerging ... (is) not the CTBT India envisaged in 1954. This cannot be the 
CTBT that India can be expected to accept. Our capability is demonstrated but, as a matter of 
policy, we exercise restraint. Countries around us continue their weapon program, either openly or 
in a clandestine manner. In such environment, India cannot accept any restraint on its capability, if 
other countries remain unwilling to accept the obligation to eliminate their nuclear weapons ... Such 
a treaty is not conceived as a measure towards universal nuclear disarmament and is not n India’s 
national security interest. India, therefore, cannot subscribe to it in its present form.” (Statement 
1996c). 
 
In this statement New Delhi showed its angriness that nuclear weapon states do not really want to 
give up their nuclear weapons – they do agree on CTBT only because they have found other means 
and ways to improve their current stockpiles and develop new models of nuclear devices. The 1995 
NPT Extension Review Conference already added to New Delhi’s belief that nuclear powers do not 
really want to disarm. “[T]he NPT has been extended indefinitely and unconditionally, perpetuating 
the existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of the five countries who are also permanent members 
of the UN Security Council” (Vajpayee 1998: 5). 
Meanwhile, India was trying to trade CTBT for acknowledging its status as a nuclear weapon state, 
an improved relationship with the United States and eliminating sanctions imposed on India after its 
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nuclear tests. However, as at the same time, Washington rejected the CTBT, and India took the “wait 
and see” course on that issue. 
According to former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India’s position on the CTBT was the 
outcome of an unsuccessful quest for security guarantees among world leading powers. This is from 
a statement he gave after the Indian underground nuclear tests in 1998 (Statement 1998). St. 
Andrews University Professor William Walker, who studies nuclear policy issues, points out that 
New Delhi took the course of realpolitik –“[s]ecurity had to rest on power and power on capabilities” 
(Walker 1996: 61). The Indian government became convinced that nuclear weapons prevent a state 
from being pushed around by nuclear powers, assure national security and increase the states 
prestige. India evolved from an innocent nuclear “non-have” and “fighter for disarmament” to a 
“nuclear ambiguity” and finally to a de facto nuclear weapon state, although outside the NPT regime. 
It is notable how its nuclear policy changed over time. The touchstone not to enter the NPT club was 
to keep “with the basic objective of maintaining freedom of though and action” (Vajpayee 1998: 5). 
“Indian nuclear strategy [...] has been an idiosyncratic mix influenced much by Mahatma Gandhi and 
Nehru’s non-violence and pacifism and battered by contrary ground realities” (Frey 2004: 338).  
China plays a major role in Indian policy formulation:  
 
“In the mid-1990s, India has watched with trepidation the reform and re-equipment of China’s 
armed forces, its precipitous economic expansion, its aggressive behavior towards Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, and territories in the South China Sea, its development of port facilities in Myanmar, and its 
continuing political repression in Tibet and Xinjiang” (Walker 1996: 63).  
 
Typical thinking of Indian politicians mentions the deployment of the USS Enterprise in the Bay of 
Bengal in 1971, China’s nuclear tests after the NPT Review Conference in 1995, border disputes 
with both China and Pakistan as well as a nuclear stronger China as factors determining India’s 
security concerns over time. 
 
State level 
India conducted its Peaceful Nuclear Explosion in 1974 partly to divert public attention from 
domestic instability. India announced five nuclear tests in May 1998, a development made possible 
by the rise of the nationalistic Bharatiya Janata Party. According to a SIPRI researcher, today the 
nuclear debate in India takes place on two levels: political and military-technical (Gopalaswamy 
2010: 2). As research topic, however, the economic level should be added as well.  
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The political dimension evolved from New Delhi’s unilateral and bilateral agreements. Currently, 
India is bound by its internal ban on nuclear testing (Statement 2008). This, however, can be easily 
lifted up by the government in the light of a national security need. Another factor is the U.S.-India 
nuclear deal. A nuclear test conducted by India would terminate the nuclear cooperation agreement, 
meaning returning all U.S.-origin nuclear materials and technology. New Delhi's’ audacious 
interpretation of this issue has been stated by the External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee in 
October 2008: “India has the right to test while others have the right to react” (Gill 2009). Despite of 
its offensive rhetoric, New Delhi would probably not bind itself with nuclear testing bans, when 
having such a test in mind... at least in the nearest future. So what hinders India from ratifying the 
CTBT? 
Currently, it is the ongoing military-technical debate, which influences New Delhi's resistance. It 
covers the issue of the credibility of India’s nuclear weapons. The discussion over India’s need for 
further testing has been heated up in 2009 by the former official with the Defence Research and 
Development Organisation K. Santhanam, claiming the hydrogen bomb test in 1998 being a “fizzle”. 
On that ground a group of famous scientists called for more nuclear tests (IANS 2009a). Some 
scientists believe that India has the needed knowledge and technology in order to improve and 
modernize its nuclear weapons without testing. This would implicate, that if the United States and 
China would ratify the CTBT, India might be persuaded to do the same (Rajaraman 2010: 33). 
Historically, scientists had enormous influence on nuclear policy. They maintained close and “highly 
secret relationships with a series of successive Indian prime ministers, including at least two (Shastri 
and Morarji Desai), who were personally opposed to the nuclear option” (Heo et.al. 2003:  150-151). 
As this pattern still may be valid, the scientific environment might be playing a crucial role in the 
upcoming debate that will determine New Delhi’s position towards CTBT.  
The economic dimension arose from economic needs of citizens and is in favor of the treaty. Trade 
unions recently urged the Indian government to sign the CTBT and “use the trillions of rupees they 
spend on bomb-making and arms trade for poverty eradication and the welfare of their people” (The 
Hindu 2010). However, unless this call will not evolve into a national quest for social equality, it is 
doubtful that society as such will have a deep impact on the governmental decision. 
 
Summary 
Although time has passed since 1996, India’s position vis-à-vis the CTBT seems to be unchanged. 
Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon stated in 2009 that “[w]e won’t stand in the way ... but it 
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should be a CTBT which actively contributes to nuclear disarmament” (IANS 2009). However, after 
joining the nuclear weapon “club”, India’s argument on the need to disarm does not seem to be 
convincing any more. The security-related argument seems to be a more plausible explanation. With 
New Delhi’s sustained feeling of inferiority versus China and superiority vis-à-vis Pakistan, both of 
which improve their nuclear capabilities, it does not seem feasible for India to eventually abandon 
further testing. Thus it is difficult to predict India’s attitude towards the CTBT, as its nuclear policy 
changed rapidly over the last years and does not seem to be fully expanded and definitive. “For 
reasons internal and external to the country, India is experiencing extreme difficulty in finding a 
pathway out of the labyrinth that it has ventured into. It seems unable to advance or retreat. And 
because India is trapped, the international community is also trapped” (Walker 1996: 61). Taking 
into account all findings presented above, an internal debate over the CTBT and the utility of nuclear 
testing has to take place first, before any further steps will be conducted. It is sure that India will not 
join the CTBT club before China and Washington do.  
 
3.4. Indonesia 
 
At the 2010 NPT Review Conference Indonesia officially announced, that it initiates the process of 
ratification of the CTBT (Remarks 2010). According to a state official of the Republic of Indonesia, 
a period of six months for the treaty to be ratified should be enough (Interview 2010c). According to 
its statement to the Article XIV Conference in 2009, Indonesia has “no difficulty with the provisions 
of the treaty” (Statement 2009a), no surprising problems should hinder the ratification. Indonesia 
already fulfilled the obligations of the CTBT within the framework of the South-East Asia Nuclear 
Weapon Free Zone it is a member of. Jakarta is aware of the advantages the treaty gives. It always 
reiterated the importance of the global tsunami early warning system within the CTBT (Statement 
2003a, 2005b) and in 2008 signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Tsunami Early Warning with 
the Provisional Technical Secretariat. It thus might be interesting to closely watch the reasons for 
Indonesia to wait so long with this grand decision. The reluctance against CTBT has its explanation 
at the intra-state level – searching for an international bargain, as well as at the state level – Indonesia 
is a country that tremendously has changed within the last 14 years. 
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Intra-state level 
Although continuously stating the treaties importance as a milestone on the way to disarmament, 
Indonesia underlined the main responsibility for the CTBT early entry into force to lie upon nuclear 
weapons states (Statement 2005b, 2009a), “who must first and foremost commit to the treaty” 
(Remarks 2010). As it traditionally tried to stay outside and be independent from global power 
conflicts and alliances, its ”strategic interests are largely regional” (Vaughn 2009: 25). China, which 
also is a member of the “hold-outs club”, might have been the only concern for Indonesia in terms of 
security issues, due to the unresolved “territorial dispute related to the south China Sea” (Vaughn 
2009: 25). However, Indonesia having no nuclear weapons and not showing any intent to acquire any 
could not really put pressure on China to ratify the CTBT. 
 
State level 
According to Marty M. Natalegawa, who serves as the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, it was due to 
the political transition which took time and opportunity capacities that the CTBT was not yet put on 
the working agenda (Statement 2009a). Already in the 2005 Statement to the Article XIV 
Conference, it has been mentioned that “at the moment, Indonesia, as a matter of priority, is 
concentrating its efforts on accomplishing reforms and democratization with a view to creating good 
governance, fighting corruption, restructuring the economy, creating jobs, eradicating poverty and 
building the peace in Aceh” (Statement 2005b). Today, however, “progress towards institutionalizing 
its democracy and [...] establishing civil society” has been made (Vaughn 2009: 9). Nevertheless, 
Indonesia still struggles with internal security threats coming from autonomous and secessionist 
movements resulting from Indonesia’s colonial past, which occupies governmental attention at most. 
As for the moment, this issue has been well handled by the President Susilo Bam-bang Yudhoyono, 
who is popular for his international and pro-west attitude and is being named the “advocate of soft 
power” (Ziegenhein 2009: 87). Due to a more stable domestic situation it has been possible to put 
more attention on international issues, like the CTBT (Interview 2010c). The Foreign Minister Marty 
Natalegawa submitted a bill on the ratification to the House [of Representatives] (The Jakarta Post 
2011) and extensive consultations take part, also in form of parliamentarian visits to the CTBTO 
(CTBTO 2011). According to Muhammad Najib, Member of the Indonesian House of 
Representatives, “For the Indonesian Parliament it is not an issue of whether or not to ratify this 
international treaty, but more about when and how to go about doing it in the best manner possible” 
(CTBTO 2011). 
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Summary 
Indonesia has lived the purpose of CTBT for a long time, but decided to initiate the ratification 
process after achieving a stable domestic situation. There has never been opposition towards a CTBT 
or security related concerns that hindered ratification as Indonesia is not a member of the “nuclear-
haves club”.  
 
3.5. Iran 
 
According to a Member of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United 
Nations, the reason for Iran’s prolonged ratification process of CTBT lies in the democratic state 
organization and the way domestic institutions work (Interview 2010d). However, official statements 
reveal much deeper problems related to Teheran's reluctance. They are mostly connected with the 
Iranian regional security perception and the “unfair structure” of the international nuclear regime in 
general. Iran is fed up with double-standard policies of some nuclear weapon states and reacts in a 
tit-for-tat manner with no transparency in terms of its own nuclear program. In assessing Iran’s 
attitude towards CTBT it is critical to answer the question why Iran might want to have nuclear 
weapons and if a potential testing need might be derived from this goal. 
 
Inter-state level 
According to Ambassador Soltanieh, who represents Iran in Vienna, “several negative developments 
jeopardize the treaties entry into force” (Statement 2007a). Foremost, it is  presented as being 
connected with the Israelis clandestine nuclear weapons arsenal. Due to the Iranian believe that the 
Middle East is threatened and intimidated by the Israeli clandestine nuclear program, it calls 
Jerusalem to reveal its nuclear capabilities and join the NPT (Statement 2001a, 2007a). The 
international community is being called to acknowledge that the possession of nuclear weapons by 
Israel is a violation of international laws (Statement 2007a). Iran’s former deputy president Ayatollah 
Mohajerani stated in 1991 that “if the Zionist regime has the right to possess nuclear weapons, then 
all Muslim countries have this right as well” (Feldman 1997: 137) – an indication for Iran’s mistrust 
in international nonproliferation efforts. Iran particularly states that the “policy of terror” – a clear 
reference to Israel – is the reason why regional countries do not fully support the CTBT. Teheran 
claims that another obstacle on the way towards CTBT ratification is the artificial regional grouping 
system that has been imposed within the organization of the CTBTO. It even goes further by stating 
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that including “Israel in the Middle East and South Asia Group [...] has caused a deadlock and 
consequently deprived an important group of countries from active participation in some aspects of 
the work of CTBTO” (Statement 2001a).  
Another reason for Iran to reject the CTBT might be its own nuclear program – which it claims has a 
peaceful civilian character. However, suspicions over its true intentions shake the international 
community for a long time already. Transparency in terms of nuclear activities is lacking. Although 
no evidence on a nuclear weapons program has been disclosed, some facts might serve as indication 
for a military nuclear project (Kalinowski 2006). Several reasons are being mentioned as possible 
motivation for Iran to get nuclear. They can be put into the category ‘security’ and ‘status and 
influence’. As for the security part, Iran’s out-of-date conventional capability could not really deter a 
potential aggressor or serve its purposes (Chubin 2001: 111). This conventional inferiority is being 
strengthened by Iran’s tremendously bad experience from the Iran-Iraq war. “Self-reliance and ‘non-
dependence’ have since become catchwords in relation to security” (Chubin 2001: 111). However, 
Iraq does not pose a threat to Iran anymore. There has been a shift in Iran’s insecurity source 
perception – today the threat is being associated with “the West” and the United States in particular. 
Iran fears the U.S. dominance in the region, even more after being named together with Iraq and 
North Korea within the ‘axis of evil’ by President G.W. Bush. The former President stated that the 
U.S. “goal is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and 
allies with weapons of mass destruction. […] Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports 
terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian peoples’ hope for freedom” (State of the Union 
Address 2002).  Even if the new American government alleviated its rhetoric, the allegations left a 
deep scar onto the security perception of Iran, even more as it still is under international fire for its 
civil nuclear program. Iran consequently underlines that it did not pose any threat to any country for 
already 300 years. President Mahmood Ahmadinejad  reiterated in August 2006 that “Iranians are not 
a people of aggression and intimidation [and] Iran does not even pose a threat to Israel” (Lotfian 
2007: 9). Unfortunately, the same Iranian leader is known for several controversial statements on the 
right of existence for the occupation regime over Jerusalem (The New York Times 2005; The 
Guardian 2006; Cole 2006). 
Ad vocem ‘status’ issue S. Chubin, from the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, points out reasons 
for Teheran’s dissatisfaction – “wanting a wider role”, seeking recognition and acknowledgement, 
wanting equality and parity, being “a state with a sense of mission to act as a ‘role model’ for other 
(Islamic) states”, thus having a strong incentive to demonstrate leadership qualities (Chubin 2001: 
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111). Undoubtedly, Iran aspires to become a regional power. As its economic growth has been 
hindered either by wars or economic sanctions, it might seek nuclear power as regional status 
reinforcement. In this context, nuclear testing would be crucial. Iran does not have international 
support in that matter, as there is no state willing to share nuclear know-how that could guarantee 
Iran’s nuclear weapons utility and efficiency, like it probably was the case with Israel. Due to this, 
testing would be indispensable to achieve reliable nuclear capabilities. Of course, only after taking 
North Korea’s path and withdrawing from the NPT. In that case, however, Teheran would be playing 
a destructive game, as it officially underlines no interest and the “un-Islamic” character of nuclear 
weapons. Assuming that Iran decides to develop a nuclear weapon, the question arises why did it 
sign the CTBT at all? On the one hand, Teheran might have done it in order to temporarily improve 
its international image, knowing that the chances of the treaties entry into force are very low. On the 
other hand, the decision might have been a guarantee for further calm work on its civil nuclear 
program until it acquires nuclear capabilities, takes the decision to develop nuclear weapons and is 
ready for nuclear testing. 
Although Iran participated fully and constructively in the CTBT negotiations (Johnson 2009: 226), it 
is not satisfied with the final text, as it does not ban all nuclear test explosions, leaving non-explosive 
nuclear testing allowed (Statement 2001b and 2007a). Iran is disappointed with nuclear powers 
involved in developing new types and modernizing old nuclear weapons, particularly referring to 
actions violating NPT article VI. Teheran emphasizes that CTBT has to be a step towards nuclear 
disarmament. When signing the treaty, it made the declaration that “the Treaty does not meet nuclear 
disarmament criteria as originally intended” and that it does not see the CTBT ”to be meaningful, 
however, unless it is considered a step towards a phased program for nuclear disarmament with 
specific time frames through negotiations on a consecutive series of subsequent treaties” 
(Reservation 1996). It also points out its disappointment that nuclear-weapon states do not do enough 
to eliminate nuclear weapons and try to keep the status quo instead (Statement 2007a). Iran points to 
the US rejection of the treaty as a threatening setback that enormously affected the CTBT ratification 
process (Statement 2001b). Moreover, it also believes that the primary responsibility on CTBT lies 
upon nuclear weapon states, which have to ratify the treaty first (Statement 2007a).  
 
State level 
“Domestically, CTBT does not seem like a hard sell” (Horowitz et.al. 2010: 14). Most Iranian 
citizens favor nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but not necessary for nuclear weapons, which 
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would determine nuclear test explosions. However, increasing repressions against the population that 
does not favor Presidents Ahmadinejad’s policy, serve as evidence that opposing ideas are not being 
discussed, but suppressed. It is the “political elites that determine national security policies in the 
Supreme National Security Council” (Chubin 2006: 31). As, according to Chubin, their majority 
consists of either pragmatic or ideological conservative hard-liners, their perception of Iran’s security 
is based on the “no survival without military power” premise (Chubin 2006:31-32). This pessimistic-
realistic approach might implicate favoring nuclear weapons as the most reliable ‘deterrent’ and a 
symbol of power.  
 
Summary 
According to the Report of Pugwash Consultations on CTBT Entry Into Force “[i]n Iran the issue of 
the CTBT is not considered separate from nuclear negotiations” (Cotta-Ramusino et.al. 2010: 7). 
Based upon presented facts, a necessary condition for Iran to consider CTBT ratification is Israel 
revealing its nuclear program and joining the NPT. Moreover, nuclear weapon states would need to 
achieve deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals. Another necessary condition would be the improvement 
of security in the Middle East region. Taking the CTBT as a hostage for bargaining reasons is 
plausible as Teheran tries to cooperate in terms of its nuclear program (although insufficient in 
Western eyes) and shows itself eager to avoid international isolation known from the North Korean 
experience. However, the most probable explanation is that Iran plays with time on the way to its 
own nuclear program. 
 
3.6. Israel 
 
The reluctance to ratify the CTBT by the non-NPT Israel is a mix of regional security concerns, its 
nuclear opacity doctrine and domestic hard-liners fighting for freedom of operation. Israel is 
signatory of the PTBT since 1964 and of the CTBT, and steadily reiterates its “firm” and 
“unequivocal” support and commitment to the treaties objectives at the Article XIV Conferences 
(Statement 1999, 2003b, 2005c, 2007b, 2009b). It also considers the prohibition on nuclear testing as 
part of its national approach to nuclear security and stability (Statement 2005c, 2007b). In order to 
understand the states position, answers to the following questions have to be given: why did Israel 
develop its own nuclear arsenal and why does it live the “deterrence through uncertainty” doctrine? 
Did Israel test its nuclear weapons and may it do that in the future?  
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Inter-state level 
The Nazi Holocaust and the War of Independence in 1948 reassured the Israeli nation that when it 
comes to secure their existence, there is no better for this job than they themselves. Due to its long 
term survival concerns, Israel acquired a nuclear deterrent to serve as a national insurance policy. As 
the state of Israel is not being recognized by its well-armed neighbors and has been involved in 
several territorial conflicts with Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Syria (1948, 1967, 1973, 1990-1991), the 
nuclear weapons program fulfilled the role of a security guarantor. Through this perspective, 
obtaining a nuclear capability meant getting “deterrence for survival” (Khan 2002: 207) against 
conventionally superior enemies. Moreover, it did not have security guarantees when taking the 
decision on starting its own nuclear weapons program. As Israel has never been striving to become a 
regional or world power, the “prestige” and “searching for hegemony” factors do not seem to be 
applicable in that case. Further, gaining prestige would require Israel to conduct nuclear explosions, 
which it never did officially. It is suspected to have conducted a nuclear explosion on September 22, 
1979 in the South Atlantic, but there is no certainty about the character of the explosion within the 
scientific community (for further reading: Ad hoc Panel Report on the September 22 event, 1980; 
Los Alamos National Laboratory 1982). Israel never admitted this test. Why did Israel never 
officially confirm its nuclear status through testing? “Opacity has been successful in Israeli eyes, 
allowing Israel to enjoy a regional nuclear monopoly without incurring the political cost of 
possessing nuclear weapons” (Cohen 1998: 342).  Thus Israelis reluctance vis-à-vis CTBT has to be 
viewed through a brighter perspective. It is not a member in any treaty considering ABC weapons 
(CWC, BWC, NPT) and is opposing even the idea of negotiating the FMCT. Israel thus wants to 
have all security options open, unless its sovereignty is fully accepted by all members of the world 
community. In this light a question arises: why did Israel sign the CTBT at all? The decision seems 
to be based on several conclusions: first, the treaty allows Israel to voice its general support for 
global non-proliferation efforts. It might have been influenced by the American non-proliferation 
policy and finally, it did not jeopardize the opacity of its nuclear program. 
There are three main factors that Israel repeats at every Conference on Facilitating the Entry into 
Force of the CTBT as necessary prerequisites for the treaties ratification. First, the verification 
regime has to be fully developed, immune to abuse and ready for operation (Statement 1999, 2003b, 
2005c). Apparently, “Israel fears that hostile neighbors will use false charges of nuclear testing as a 
way to gain access to sensitive Israeli facilities via verification inspections” (Horowitz et. al. 2010: 
10). This argument, however, does not seem very convincing. Verification inspections will be 
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conducted under strong treaty rules - they will need approval of 30 of 51 Executive Council 
members, explicitly based upon data from the verification system and conducted only in the area of 
the alleged explosion, so without investigation of other nuclear facilities. Second, at all Article XIV 
Conferences Israel demands “sovereign equality status” in the decision making bodies of the CTBTO 
(Statement 1999, 2003b, 2005c, 2007b, 2009b) – within the Executive Council geographical region 
of the Middle East and South Asia (MESA). This argument refers to Iran making the work of the 
MESA group impossible for “reasons completely alien to the purposes of the Treaty” (Statement 
2005c, 2007b). This is why Israel calls for a depoliticized organizational infrastructure of the 
CTBTO. “Although Iran’s behavior is unlikely to change dramatically in the near future, this 
comparatively minor issue is neither likely to force Israel to abandon a treaty it favors nor to provide 
a plausible excuse for it to remain outside of the CTBT” (Horowitz et.al. 2010: 10). The third factor 
is the adherence and compliance to the treaty by other states within the Middle East. It is important to 
view the third precondition through the fact that Israel is not a member of the NPT regime, but sees 
itself in the position to teach other states “the rules of the game”. Unfortunately, all those 
preconditions are being called by Israel as “longer term considerations” (Statement 2005c), which 
might be an indication, that Israel sees no rush in CTBT entering into force. 
 
State level 
All Israeli leaders have been “determined to maintain Israel’s nuclear opacity, even though their 
characteristics and personalities have varied widely” (Khan 2002: 197). The Israeli army has a 
considerable influence on nuclear decision-taking. However, as a conventional army, it is not 
interested in shifting budget money from its conventional expenditures towards nuclear projects. 
Apart from the fact that Israel never officially confirmed its nuclear status, the defense military 
establishment will probably block any unnecessary spending which might lead to preparing nuclear 
test explosions, unless it is not triggered by national security needs (Solingen 2007: 210). Although, 
after India and Pakistan officially entered the nuclear “club”, the world was waiting for Israel to be 
next, but nothing happened. “Scientific preparations were there, but the decision to nuclearize was 
not because of the absence of necessity” (Khan 2002: 198). The “absence of necessity” seems weird 
and might suggest that Israel possess reliable and adequate knowledge on nuclear weapons design 
and may also indicate that it already obtained computer-simulation capabilities.  
As for the highly patriotic citizenry in Israel, they do not play a role within the nuclear policy debate 
due to the widely accepted “code of silence” (Cohen 1996: 344). Fact is that national security is the 
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primary concern of the Israeli nation. Due to the persistent Arab-Israeli rivalry and Israel’s 
vulnerability to Arab strikes, it might be assumed that public opinion accepts nuclear weapons. 
Important to note, however, is the fact that the “ambiguous posture helped arrest the development of 
a public debate [...], maintained domestic consensus and provided those involved in directing the 
development of Israel’s nuclear potential with high degree of policy autonomy” (Feldman 1997: 99). 
Instability connected with the Palestinian case also poses an obstacle in the Israel vis-à-vis CTBT 
case. 
Concerning the economic dimension, “Israel’s small size, population and resource base make it a 
weak state when compared to its Arab adversaries, and it might be likely that Israel possesses nuclear 
weapons to gain leverage in international politics” (Khan 2002: 203). This argument, however, does 
not seem to be rationale, as Israel has many supporters in terms of military help or economic 
cooperation, even though it does not play within the internationally acknowledged “system of rules”. 
There is a better explanation, referring to the “Zionist ethos of science and technology compensating 
its lack of resources” and pointing to the father of Israel Ben Gurion stating that “we are inferior to 
other peoples [...] but no other people is superior to us in its intellectual prowess” (Cohen 2006: 34).  
 
Summary 
Israel rejects the CTBT, as it does with all other international security treaties, as it wants to have the 
nuclear option opened as long as its security is endangered. Probably, Israel does not have any 
intention for nuclear testing, as its political leaders keep stating after the 1961 Prime Minister Levi 
Eshkol pledge that “Israel will not be the first nation to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle 
East” (c.f. Cohen 2006: 35). However, as Israel has never had the need to conduct nuclear testing, it 
would gain more than risk anything by ratifying the CTBT.  
  
“Overall, Israel’s objections to the CTBT are relatively mild, and its posture of ‘nuclear ambiguity’ 
means that the treaty would not present it with a significant security limitation. Given these facts, 
Israel may have good reason to try to divert attention from its lack of action in other areas by 
ratifying the CTBT” (Horowitz et.al. 2010: 10).  
 
Thus the CTBT might one day become a bargaining instrument, used by the world community in the 
light of Israeli need for something. Meanwhile, by keeping its nuclear supremacy, Israel will do 
everything to deny Arab states any attempt to acquire nuclear weapons (1981 bombing Iraq’s reactor; 
2007 bombing Syria’s nuclear facility). Unless transparency in the region in terms of weapons of 
CTBT Hold-out States.  
Why did „the longest sought, hardest fought prize in arms control history” still not enter into force? 
 
30 
 
mass destruction will be introduced, Israel will not see any value added in limiting its freedom of 
operation. The Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone seems to be a good direction.  
 
3.7. North Korea 
 
North Korea is just at the beginning of its nuclear weapons program development and conducted two 
nuclear explosions in 2006 and 2009. Pyongyang does not consider the CTBT at that moment, even 
less as further tests have already been mentioned in political statements (Statement 2009c). The 
CTBT has not been signed nor ever mentioned in official speeches. In this case it might be 
conclusive to elaborate the reasons for the two previous nuclear tests – both on the intra-state and 
state level separately.  
 
Inter-state level 
North Korea’s (in)security perception diverted from Pyongyang’s geo-historical position. DPRK is 
the outcome of the Cold War ideology struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
After the end of the Cold War, DPRK lost its most important ally – Russia - and had to face a world 
driven by capitalism and democracy, which it denied. As the communist government has not been 
accepted by the world community, North Korea felt into international isolation, which strongly 
weakened its economy. Today China plays a major role in North Korea, providing the regime with 
fuel, food supplies, industrial equipment etc. (c.f. Shen 2006; Snyder 2009; Nanto et.al 2010). This 
attitude descends from Beijing’s fear of a potential North Korean regimes collapse and an immense 
and uncontrolled influx of refugees to China as consequence. This tight relationship makes a 
coherent international approach to the DPRK difficult (e.g. in the UNSC). Nevertheless, North Korea 
does not have allies in terms of security and is being more and more isolated on the international 
scene. By withdrawing from the NPT framework, further work on its clandestine nuclear program 
and finally, testing nuclear explosions, it only strengthened this state of affairs. The eventual 
withdrawal from NPT on January 10, 2003 has been motivated as an answer “to the U.S. vicious 
hostile policy towards the DPRK. [...] After the appearance of the Bush administration, the United 
States listed the DPRK as a part of an ‘axis of evil’, adopting it as a national policy to oppose its 
system, and singled it out as a target of pre-emptive nuclear attack, openly declaring a nuclear war” 
(Withdrawal Statement 2003). In order to bring North Korea back to the NPT regime and 
establishing a comprehensive approach to the Korean Peninsula, the so called “Six-Party-Talks” 
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started in 2003 with diplomats from the DPRK, South Korea, Japan, Russia, the United States and 
China gathering at a table. The Joint Statement from 2005 foresaw Pyongyang giving up its nuclear 
weapons program in exchange for humanitarian assistance and energy, American security guarantees 
and normalization of relations with the United States (Joint Statement 2005). The six negotiating 
parties also agreed to the peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, the DPRK returning to 
the NPT and opening its facilities to IAEA inspectors. A breakdown in negotiations was caused by 
complications over a release of North Korean assets from a bank in Macao (Chanlett-Avery et.al. 
2010: 6). In this international context the first nuclear explosion has been conducted by North Korea 
on October 9, 2006. What intra-state reasons might be found to explain this test? One of the 
incentives would be the fear from U.S. expansionism strategy to counter international problems and 
fight unwanted regimes – the “axis-of-evil”. In order to prevent Japan and South Korea from 
acquiring nuclear weapons, the United States protects those allies from the North. Thousands of 
American troops are stationed in the Pacific “within the proven striking range of North Korean 
missiles” (Chanlett-Avery et.al. 2010: 2). The DPRK might have felt endangered and embattled, thus 
it conducted the test in order to deter the potential threat. The DPRK strives for normalized relations 
with neighboring states and the United States. This is why the test might also have been “a desperate 
effort to secure bilateral negotiations with the United States and, once in negotiations, have more 
leverage” (Chanlett-Avery et.al. 2006: 5). Moreover, it has been “noted that the day after the test was 
the 61st anniversary of the founding of the ruling Korean Workers’ Party and that Kim may have 
intended to use the test to rally public support and stir nationalistic sentiment. October 9 itself was 
also the day on which the UN Security Council confirmed the nomination of South Korea’s Foreign 
Minister Ban Ki-moon to succeed Kofi Annan as the U.N.’s new secretary-general, and there was 
even some speculation the test was in part intended to spoil the South Korean diplomat’s big 
moment” (Chinoy 2008: 296-297).  
Again on May 25, 2009 a test has been conducted by North Korea, followed by an ”announcement 
on April 14, 2009, that it was withdrawing from the six party talks” (Niksch 2010: 3). The pivotal 
moment came as a result of the UN Security Council condemning Pyongyang’s long-range 
Taepodong II missile “satellite launch” in April 2009 and sanctions that followed. “The UNSC 
should promptly make an apology for having infringed the sovereignty of the DPRK and withdraw 
all its unreasonable and discriminative ‘resolutions’ and decisions adopted against the DPRK”, a 
spokesman for the regime stated right after the launch (Statement 2009c). Other nuclear tests have 
been mentioned in case the UNSC does not give an immediate apology. This threat has been carried 
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out with the second test. A press release from the state news agency of North Korea – the Korean 
Central News Agency (KCNA) explained the value added by the test as contributing to “defending 
the sovereignty of the country and the nation and socialism and ensuring peace and security on the 
Korean Peninsula and the region around it [...]” (KCNA 2009). The statement used the same 
language as it was the case with the 2006 test, apart from the “defending socialism” part, which 
indicates that the anxiety over the regimes forth-living is still valid. Worth indication, that the 
statement “did not mention Kim Jong-il and strongly suggested that the military played a decisive 
role in North Korea’s decision to withdraw from talks and that the military would control future 
policy regarding nuclear programs” (Nikitin et.al. 2009: 15). The DPRK explained in the letter to the 
UN Security Council:  
 
“[h]ad the Security Council, from the very beginning, not made an issue of the DPRK’s peaceful 
satellite launch, in the same way as it kept silent over the satellite launch conducted by South Korea 
on 25 August 2009, it would not have compelled the DPRK to take strong counteraction, such as its 
second nuclear test” (S/2009/443)  
 
– an indication for North Korea’s perception of unequal treatment.  
The nuclear weapons program as well as nuclear explosions are important political instruments 
which North Korea uses in order to secure humanitarian assistance from the international community 
and gain prestige and recognition. This “guns versus butter” trade-offs secure humanitarian aid from 
abroad, ensure the regime’s domestic and international forth-living, and strengthen Pyongyang’s 
international position and the regime’s control over its people. It seems as if North Korea would seek 
international acknowledgement of Pyongyang’s political system probably more in the Chinese-model 
direction – according to its premises trade is welcome, but domestic policy is the issue of the 
government only. DPRK demands go far above the quest for humanitarian assistance. Another factor 
might be the quest for customers of North Korean nuclear technology. To improve the government’s 
income, the DPRK might plan to sell its nuclear technology and/or know-how to other states or other 
actors. There is already evidence of Pyongyang’s deals on missile and nuclear technology with Iran, 
Syria, and Burma. Test explosions of nuclear devices might thus had to be done in order to prove its 
nuclear knowledge and technology, which was aimed at convincing potential buyers of the 
competence of North Korea’s scientists.  
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State level 
In order to understand the complex context of the test, it is important to look at the dynamics within 
the government and inner affairs. There is another front on which the Stalinist regime in Pyongyang 
appears to fight to secure its forthcoming existence – its own society, government, and military. 
North Korea is a “pre-modern dynastic state” (Suk Ahn 2009: 1), a kind of a family-run business. 
Kim Jong-Il, suffering from health problems, deals with a decision on his succession. None of his 
three sons gained enough respect within the Confucian standards to directly take their fathers place. 
Another issue is the weakening economic situation. “The DPRK is really two economies. The first is 
that of the military, the Korean Workers Party, and the government elite. [...] It lives off the 
production from the second economy, the rest of the country” (Nikitin et.al. 2009: 6). As over 15% 
of the state budget is being consumed by military spending, while the society suffers hunger and 
poorness, “if any meaningful reforms are to take hold in North Korea, the defense budget will have 
to bear some of the cutbacks” (Gause 2006: 45). Securing humanitarian aid foremost means to 
“provide a reasonably quality of life for the country’s elite” (Nanto et. al. 2010: 8). While the 
situation of ordinary people is worsening, the regime sees a greater value in developing effective 
deterrent on the other hand and is thus reluctant to shift spending into reforms. Thus humanitarian aid 
has to be secured from abroad – in the worst scenario by bargaining assistance for nuclear issues. 
Thus can an explanation on the domestic level be found for each of the nuclear tests? The tipping 
point for Kim Jong-Il to conduct the first nuclear test in October 2006 might come from the need to 
strengthen his and his successor’s position within the “military-driven” regime. As the regime 
already before used different “impressive events” to get more leverage in its bargains with the west, 
the test might be seen as an attempt to obtain more needed humanitarian aid. After the 2006 nuclear 
explosion, the international community still “provided DPRK with food and fuel assistance in 
exchange for denuclearization”, however, it is doubtful that it will “buy the same horse twice” 
(Nikitin et.al. 2009: 7). May 25, 2009 – and again a domestic factor played a role in testing the 
second nuclear device. “Kim Jong-il had ordered the North’s military, politicians, and officials in 
overseas missions to swear allegiance to Kim Jong-un [Kims youngest son] after Pyongyang’s May 
nuclear test” (Suk Ahn 2009: 1).  As the future North Korean leader did not manage to consolidate 
enough support in order to secure his position, ensuring a smooth power transition is considered to be 
possible only by being accepted by the KPA, KWP and the cabinet – in the majority consisting of 
hard-liners (c.f. Gause 2006). 
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Summary 
It is very difficult to project the motivation of such a secretive regime. “Fear of nuclear weapons has 
provided the lynchpin for a strategy of ‘calculated irrationality’ or ‘strategic deception” (Stratford 
2005: 129). The CTBT does not fit into the approach of the Stalinist regime in Pyongyang and 
further tests have been announced. “If the North cannot secure long-term regime stability by 
manufacturing external strife to engender internal solidarity, it will do so by continuing its nuclear 
program” (Suk Ahn 2009: 2). As North Korea restarted the Yongbyon plutonium production, it 
might be tempted to test another weapon in order to improve its arsenal’s sophistication (Hecker 
2009: 5). Its nuclear capability is perceived as a national insurance and it is very unlikely that 
Pyongyang will give it up until all problems in the Korean Peninsula are solved – the presence of 
American troops, reunification with South Korea, its relations with Japan and the United States, 
secured humanitarian aid from Russia and China as well as technological help to effectively 
restructure the centrally planned market. 
 
3.8. Pakistan 
 
Although it enthusiastically signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, Pakistan does not currently 
consider signing the CTBT (Spokesman Briefing 2009). This reliance is India-reactive and is an 
outcome of a long lasting territorial dispute with India as well as anxiety of losing its sovereignty. 
However – according to Ambassador Shahbaz, who serves as Permanent Representative of Pakistan 
to the International Organizations in Vienna, Islamabad is not “opposed to the objectives and 
purposes of the treaty [and] will not be the first to resume nuclear testing” (Statement 2007c). 
Pakistan was already very close to signing the CTBT in March 2001, when “the country's Army 
corps commanders had given their approval – at a meeting reportedly held on March 19 – for the 
government to sign the CTBT without waiting for India to make a similar announcement” (The 
Acronym Institute 2001). According to the Acronym Institute, it unfortunately refrained from taking 
action after “India conducted a successful test-firing of its Prithvi medium range surface-to-surface 
ballistic missile, capable of carrying a nuclear warhead” on March 31 (The Acronym Institute 2001).  
Nevertheless, this incident indicates that Islamabad did not see any legal or technical obstacles with 
the CTBT. Conditions under which Pakistan would consider signing and ratifying the treaty evolved 
from waiting for India to do so, towards the demand of a durable structural security in the region. 
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Inter-state level 
After gaining independence in 1947 Pakistan has had to face four wars with India (1947-1948, 1965, 
1971, 1999) which resulted in territorial dismemberment of the country. Pakistan faced India’s 
superiority in conventional forces and realized the United States and China did not respond properly 
to the threat as its security allies. Islamabad concluded that the only way to make sure national 
sovereignty is being protected will be by establishing its own nuclear program. According to 
Ambassador Zamir Akram, who represents Pakistan at the Conference on Disarmament, Pakistan 
based its security policy on the premise that it has to “respond to capabilities and not intentions” 
(Statement 2010). Islamabad is not bound by the NPT, which it refused to sign due to growing 
skepticism over New Delhi's nuclear intentions. The rejection to sign the NPT by India was a sign 
that it is working on a nuclear arsenal. Worth mentioning is the Pakistani Proposal to the General 
Assembly in 1974 to establish a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in South Asia (Chakma 2009: 23), 
which did not find appropriate response. As the world did not react to Pakistani warnings on India 
getting nuclear, western countries even supporting New Delhi in its nuclear achievements, and 
Islamabad failing to obtain external security guarantees from nuclear powers, Pakistan entered the 
era of “new defense thinking” (Chakma 2009: 20). Therefore, a “nuclear option policy” has been 
adopted and after India conducted its Peaceful Nuclear Test “Buddha Smile” in 1974, Islamabad 
clandestinely shifted its peaceful nuclear program to a military one. Ambassador Akram explained 
that Pakistan “did so in the face of discriminatory and arbitrary sanctions which were applied against 
the victim and not the perpetrator of nuclear proliferation” (Statement 2010). In the aftermath, 
Islamabad tried to pursue a nuclear test ban treaty in the UN forum, although without success; but 
rejected a regional test ban treaty proposal offered by India in 1987. The security issue vis-à-vis New 
Delhi remained tense by rumors of an Indian preemptive strike on Pakistan’s nuclear installations in 
the early 1980s, the “Brasstacks” military exercise along the Pakistani border in 1986-87 (Chakma 
2009: 28) and the “Sanghe Shakti” exercise in 2006 (International Panel on Fissile Materials 2010: 
70). Islamabad was very ambitious towards its nuclear goal, which was clearly visible in a press 
conference statement of the former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto held May 1974: “If India 
developed an atomic bomb, we too will develop one even if we have to eat grass or leaves or to 
remain hungry because there is no conventional alternative to the atomic bomb” (Chakma 2009: 17).  
Islamabad took part in the CTBT negotiations, but failed to sign the treaty due to India’s “near 
nuclear test” in late 1995. During negotiations it fought for avoiding any loopholes in the test-ban-
regime, wanting a ban on all kind of tests – of either military or “peaceful“ character as well as 
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against subcritical explosions or computer simulations. Afterwards, in a tit-for-tat manner, Islamabad 
conducted six (and only) nuclear tests on May 28 and 30, 1998 as an answer to India carrying out 
nuclear explosions on May 11 and 13, 1998. These tests transferred Pakistan into the nuclear power 
league. Crucial to mention is the moratorium on nuclear testing being published in the aftermath of 
the tests (Statement 2007c). Within the new reality however, Islamabad did not work out a 
comprehensive nuclear posture. From official statements it can be concluded that Pakistan maintains 
an India-reactive minimum credible nuclear deterrence, lives a nuclear first-use policy (after 
rejecting India’s proposal to establish a bilateral no-first-use arrangement in 1998) and unilaterally 
restrained itself from further testing,  as long as India refrains from testing (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs Pakistan 2006, Statement 2007c).  
As the India-factor still influences Pakistani security strategy, Islamabad will use the CTBT to 
promote its concerns and search for international bargains. An official spokesman from the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs explained that “[i]t is important that intraregional conventional imbalances and 
interstate conflicts should be resolved to pave the way for irreversible disarmament” (Spokesman 
Briefing 2009). The most prominent of all arguments is that “the signing of the CTBT in its present 
form means that conflicts in South Asia could be ignored as regional in nature since they would be 
confined to limited conventional war.  This would allow the industrialized countries to forget about 
outstanding issues in that area. .... Interest in a solution of the Kashmir dispute was aroused as a 
consequence of nuclear potential of South Asia” (Chakma 2009: 96). Islamabad is convinced that the 
world community does not put enough focus on the region and downgrades the importance and 
urgency of the conflicts’ resolution. Although a glimpse of hope appeared on the horizon, when on 
September 23, 1998 Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz Sharif “pledged at the UN General 
Assembly that Pakistan would sign the CTBT before September 1999, so that the treaty comes into 
force” (Chakma 2009: 95), its rejection in Washington gave Pakistani government justification to 
take over a “wait and see” policy (Chakma 2009: 98). 
External factors other than the leitmotif of India have another important impact on the Pakistani 
security deliberations. The United States played unfairly during the occupation of Afghanistan by the 
Soviet Union, when Pakistan again turned out to be of huge geopolitical importance to the American 
government, but has been abandoned just after the war finished in 1990. Today, the United States 
tries to stop the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project, due to its suspicions over the character of the 
Iranian nuclear program. “Pakistanis generally assume that Washington will pursue a policy of 
rollback in relation to Pakistan once the current necessity of using Pakistan as a frontline state in the 
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global fight against terrorism will be over” (Chakma 2009: 45). Moreover, Islamabad is irritated by 
NPT nuclear weapons states violating their commitment under Article I, III and VI of the NPT 
(Statement 2010). Thus, the India-U.S. nuclear deal will not advance Pakistan signing the CTBT, as 
long as Pakistan won’t achieve a similar settlement. The exchange of American nuclear technology 
against inspections of some nuclear facilities in India enables New Delhi to acquire even more 
nuclear materials for weapons purposes and strengthens double-standards within the NPT regime. In 
2006 – most probably as an answer to the nuclear deal – Pakistan began the construction of a major 
heavy water nuclear reactor at Khushab, which might increase its weapons-grade plutonium 
production capabilities (Kronstadt 2009: 64). According to Foreign Minister Quereshi, Islamabad 
“will not accept foreign boots on its soil” (Statement 2009d), at least for the purpose of war against 
terror and sees its nuclear deterrent as an important factor in preventing other countries interfering or 
entering the country.  
It is thus clear that neither the American CTBT ratification nor external pressure will play a major 
role in Islamabad’s decision on the treaty. As all Pakistani statements and actions are very India-
reactive, it is however assumed that Islamabad would sign and ratify the CTBT after India does. On 
the other side, India’s current deliberations of repeating its 1998 nuclear tests, will definitely impact 
a mirror action from Pakistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan projected a “Strategic Restraint Regime” 
(Statement 2007) as a plan to reach durable peace and security in the region through balancing 
nuclear and conventional capabilities in both states. On behalf of the government, Ambassador 
Shahbaz explained to the Article XIV Conference that the plan includes: “(i) resolution of all 
outstanding disputes; (ii) promotion of nuclear and missile restraint; and (iii) maintenance of 
conventional forces balance” (Statement 2007c). He also openly addressed “motives and 
compulsions which prompt states to acquire nuclear weapons. These include; (i) threats from non-
conventional or superior conventional forces; (ii) the existence of disputes and conflicts with more 
powerful states, and (iii) discrimination in the application of international laws” (Statement 2007c). 
This showed the change in Pakistani demands for CTBT ratification – from India ratifying the treaty, 
to a complex plan resolving regional disputes between India and Pakistan. 
 
State level 
Ad vocem domestic political dynamics, it is worth mentioning that former Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharifs’ “government was ready to sign the treaty” in 1998 (Chakma 2009: 95), but had to withdraw 
the idea facing internal pressure. It probably has been rejected by the National Command Authority 
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of Pakistan, the highest decision making body on strategic issues (Statement 2010), that traditionally 
determined national security issues. At this time all political parties (leading Muslim League and the 
Jamat-I-Islami as well as all oppositional groupings) favored rejection of the CTBT. However, a 
debate arose within the society after the Pakistani nuclear tests, which created two adversary groups. 
CTBT proponents claim that Islamabad would gain diplomatic and political standing on the 
international arena and would release itself from foreign sanctions imposed as an answer to its 
nuclear explosions. Additionally, Pakistan would be able to search international understanding and 
support in resolving security issues vis-à-vis India. The anti-CTBT group reiterates the few nuclear 
tests being done by Pakistan, that did not give enough knowledge for further computer simulations 
and which do not guarantee reliability of the nuclear devices. They also suggest using the CTBT to 
bargain for laboratory simulation technology, as it was the case with China and France (Chakma 
2009: 95-96). Other concerns touch the issue of withdrawal difficulties after treaty signature as well 
as verification of key nuclear facilities after its entry into force, which would not be exempted from 
international on-site inspections, while Pakistan is labeled as a non-nuclear state according to the 
NPT regime. It means that CTBT inspectors would have access to nuclear facilities, which Pakistan 
does not want to disclose - on critique of this argument please refer to comments in 3.6. Interestingly, 
a break concerning the position on nuclear weapons within the political scene becomes more and 
more visible. Although the Pakistan Muslim League, Pakistan Peoples Party and Pakistan’s Islamist 
parties, which command the largest public support, still favor nuclear weapons; “Pakistan’s minority 
nationalist parties, progressive civil-society groups and some retired military officers oppose the 
nuclear program and call for disarmament” (IPFM 2010: 68). Moreover, on February 2008 Asir 
Zardari, head of the newly elected coalition-leading Pakistan People’s Party, “caused a stir when he 
suggested that Pakistan-India relations should not be hindered by differences over Kashmir [...] [that 
is] a situation on which we can agree to disagree” (Kronstadt 2009: 44-45). 
 
Summary 
Political statements do not brighten the perspective of CTBT ratification by Islamabad – “for signing 
the Treaty, we still need national consensus, while taking into account the regional security situation” 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs Pakistan 2006). According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Shah 
Mahmood Quereshi, the decision will be based purely on national security requirements to maintain 
credible nuclear deterrence (Statement 2009d), which means that Pakistan still does not roll out the 
option for further testing, if regional circumstances change respectively. “It has also been claimed by 
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Pakistani sources that at least one additional device, initially planned for detonation on 30 May 1998, 
remained emplaced underground ready for detonation” (Federation of American Scientists 2010). 
Further testing might take place if India conducts them. Otherwise, with Indian signature and 
ratification, Pakistan will probably follow. 
 
3.9. United States 
 
The United States was the first country to sign the CTBT, but still has not ratified it. For the United 
States there are particular domestic constraints that hinder CTBT ratification. The treaty became a 
highly debated issue dividing the political scene along hard-line “realist” Republicans and 
disarmament-progressive Democrats. The timeline discussed here is October 1992 (Moratorium on 
Nuclear Testing) - November 2, 2010 (2010 general elections for the 112th United States Congress). 
 
Inter-state level 
The United States plays its CTBT cards from the position of a nuclear weapons state with the biggest 
and most modern arsenal, as well as the highest number of conducted nuclear test explosions and the 
most sophisticated technological capabilities and knowledge. Thus its only concern on the intra-state 
level might be maintaining fully functioning nuclear capability in order to “balance” potential threats 
and keep the status of a global power. 
 
State level 
The American political system is very election-driven, what explains the character of the CTBT 
debate in the United States. To define the reasons for which the CTBT is being rejected, the course 
of the discussions will be presented. 
In October 1992 a Moratorium on Nuclear Testing was approved by President George H.W. Bush, 
who did not support the bill, but signed it “with his eyes on the forthcoming election and the bill’s 
allocation of funds for several key states” (Johnson 2009: 43). “The original official negotiating 
position of the Clinton administration in Geneva was to have a treaty which, one, had a definite 
duration, 10 years; two, permitted low yield tests, 4 pounds, and was also verifiable” (Hearing 2010: 
23). As the final outcome did not match the starting point of the United States in the negotiations, it 
already presented one of the reasons for opponents to criticize it. The treaty has been transmitted by 
President B. Clinton to the United States Senate for its advice and consent for ratification on 
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September 24, 1997. In order to appease the GOP Senators, President Clinton conditioned the 
American ratification of the treaty by introducing the so called “presidential safeguards”. Those 
conditions require inter alia maintaining nuclear laboratories, holding on the capability to conduct 
nuclear tests, further R&D activities on nuclear technologies and the possibility to withdraw from 
CTBT in order to undertake tests in case the reliability of the American nuclear deterrent could no 
longer be certified (in detail see Annex 4). The Republican-lead Senate blocked considering the 
treaty for over two years and spent remarkably less time debating the treaty in comparison to other 
arms control issues being discussed (see Annex 3). The hearings did not cover comprehensive 
testimonials from nuclear experts, army representatives, NATO allies’ representatives etc. As a 
consequence, the CTBT has been rejected by 48 votes in favor and 51 against with one senator 
voting “present” on October 13, 1999 (for details see Annex 4). “The “no” vote was the consequence 
of the political miscalculations of treaty proponents, the failure of many senators to understand core 
issues; the deep, partisan divisions in the nation’s capital; and the president’s failure to organize a 
strong, focused and sustained campaign” (Kimball  1999a). 
According to Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State 
for the CTBT, four types of concerns have been most prominent in the debate in 1999: 1) whether the 
Test Ban Treaty has genuine non-proliferation value; 2) whether cheating could threaten U.S. 
security; 3) whether the U.S. can maintain the safety and reliability of the its nuclear deterrent 
without nuclear explosive testing; and 4) whether it is wise to endorse a Test Ban Treaty of indefinite 
duration (Shalikashvili 2001). The main issues discussed during hearings were nuclear weapons 
testing as an instrument for building adequate confidence in stockpile safety and reliability, 
verification, new nuclear weapons (like mini nukes etc., answering new security threats), evasion 
scenarios, test readiness as a “hedge against stewardship failure and against treaty breakout by 
another nation” (Hearing 1998a: 5), the topic of rogue states under CTBT and the presidential 
safeguard on withdrawal.  
As background for understanding the 1999 debate on the merits of the CTBT, some facts will be 
presented. First, the rejection of the CTBT was closely connected with a very active campaign lead 
as early as the beginning of 1999 by some Republican Senators, like the famous CTBT opponent 
Senator Jon Kyl (R-AZ), Trent Lott (R-MS, ret.), Jesse Helms (R-NC), and Paul Coverdell (R-GA). 
Secondly, “many Republican Senators were only too eager to score partisan political points against a 
President who had so many times defeated their initiatives” (Kimball 1999b). Moreover, one of a big 
issue has been the possible withdrawal from the treaty, which could wake another country’s attention 
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as a signal of weakness and lack of confidence in American nuclear weapons. Another point of 
discussion was the highly controversial Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) initiated after 
announcing the nuclear moratorium. Its aim is to maintain “high confidence in the safety, reliability, 
and performance of nuclear stockpile indefinitely and without nuclear testing” (Hearing 1998a: 49). 
The controversy around the SSP refers on one hand to the question, if responsible stewardship of 
nuclear weapons is possible without testing. On the other hand, it means extending the nuclear 
weapons life-time, which does not match with the ‘disarmament’ effect expected to accompany 
CTBT. Records of hearings gave the impression that after the full implementation of the SSP, 
resistance against CTBT would fall down dramatically. Interestingly, it turned out that testing of 
nuclear weapons – which has been the most disputed part of the debate – has been done primarily for 
the purpose “of designing new ones, but less so when [...] in the process of making sure the old ones 
worked” (Hearing 1998b: 11). Here again lack of scientific knowledge played a vital role. Detailed 
reasons and circumstances of the CTBT being rejected have been exhaustively described elsewhere 
(c.f. Kimball 1999b). 
After rejection and “at the end of the 106th Congress, pursuant to Senate Rule XXX, paragraph 2, the 
treaty moved to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Calendar, where it currently resides” 
(Medalia, 2010: 2). The Bush Administration did not support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
and did not intend to seek Senate advice and consent to its ratification (Medalia 2010: 4). A glimpse 
of hope for the CTBT occurred with President Barack Obama’s vision of a world without nuclear 
weapons and his administration “immediately and aggressively “pursuing U.S. ratification (Obama 
2009). This attitude found its confirmation at the Article XIV Conference in September 24, 2009; 
when Secretary of State H.R. Clinton declared that the CTBT contributes to the U.S. non-
proliferation and disarmament strategy as well as the President’s long-range vision “without 
jeopardizing the safety, security, or credibility of our nuclear arsenal” (Clinton 2009). The Nuclear 
Posture Review 2010 also reiterates that the United States is “pursuing ratification and early entry 
into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty” (Nuclear Posture Review 2010: 13).  
The domestic political landscape differed from that in 1999. A comparison of the 106th (January 
1999-January 2001) and the 111th (January 2009-January 2011) Senate structure is presented in 
Annex 5.  Joseph Jofi, who serves as Senior Advisor in the Office of the Under Secretary for Arms 
Control and International Security wrote that “a Democrat, with the first clear majority of the U.S. 
popular vote since Jimmy Carter in 1976, occupies the White House, while Senate Democrats enjoy 
a 59-seat majority, the largest margin of power since 1980” (Jofi 2009: 85). As of June 2010, the 
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majority consisted of 58 Democrats and still did not manage to bring CTBT to the Senate. The 
United States midterm elections, which were held November 2, 2010 pose an obstacle for the 
ambitious presidential goal. As predicted, Republicans gained the majority in the House of 
Representatives and received additional seats in the Senate. As for the beginning of the 112th 
Congress the Democrats have 51 seats, the Republicans 47 and 2 seats go to independent Senators. 
What has been defined for the Obama Administration at the beginning of the legislation as a point on 
the roadmap to CTBT is still valid - “the key to success […] lies in pitching CTBT ratification as a 
serious national security debate to avoid it becoming a victim of partisan politics. Particular focus 
should be placed on those Republican Senators who will be exposed to this debate for the first time: 
[thirty Republican Senators in the 112th Congress] were not members in 1999 and thus ‘will evaluate 
the merits of CTBT ratification with a fresh perspective’” (Jofi 2009: 86). Meanwhile, the United 
States Administration tried to educate Senators on the topic via New START hearings at which the 
modernization of American nuclear stockpiles has been discussed in detail. Various NGOs are of 
great help as well. Unfortunately, the GOP changed diametrically during the last 10 years and 
became much more conservative, ideology driven, emphasizing American unilateralism, and 
showing no interest in the U.S. binding itself with international treaties (Interview 2010e). This 
might threaten the CTBT ratification in the nearest future. 
But how do American decision-makers judge the CTBT today? Former treaty opponents give 
positive signals towards a renewed ratification process of the CTBT. “[F]ormer Secretary of State 
George Shultz urged ratification of the CTBT [and stated] that his fellow Republicans may have been 
right in voting against it some years ago, but they would be right voting for it now based on new 
facts” (Hearing 2010: 19). However, “Senator Jon Kyl, who led the opposition to the CTBT in 1999, 
reportedly said, ‘I will lead the charge against it [the CTBT] and I will do everything in my power to 
see that it is defeated’” (Medalia 2010: 5). Apparently, Senator Kyl will not seek reelection in 2012 
(Press release 2011). As for further reading, an interesting example of the current ongoing debate is 
presented in articles exchanged between Jon Kyl (2009) and Daryl G.Kimball (2009). While Jon Kyl 
argues with old arguments against CTBT, Daryl Kimball refutes them and concludes that inaction on 
the CTBT will increase the risk of resumption of testing.  
In the meantime several assessments of the consequences of U.S. ratification of the CTBT have been 
made. The National Academy of Sciences concluded in 2002 “that the United States has the 
technical capabilities to maintain confidence in the safety and reliability of its existing nuclear-
weapon stockpile under the CTBT, provided that adequate resources are made available to the 
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Department of Energy’s nuclear-weapon complex and are properly focused on this task” (National 
Academy of Science 2002: 1). This statement responds to the mostly used argument by the treaty 
opponents from the 1999 debate. However, an initiative for a bipartisan and independent 
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture Review concluded without having an “agreed 
position on whether ratification of the CTBT should proceed” (Perry et. al. 2009: 87). 
Although President Obama planned “to seek Senate approval for ratification as soon as feasible, 
possibly before the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference 2010” (Klein 2009: 
1), it probably will not happen in the present presidential period, as other important projects are at the 
Senate desk (Interview 2010b) and the debate on the healthcare reform “has soured an already highly 
partisan atmosphere on Capitol Hill” (Butcher 2010: 2). As Undersecretary of States for Arms 
Control and International Security, Ellen Tauscher, pointed out in an interview: “The president has 
set no specific timeline for achieving ratification. [...] There is a lot of queuing and sequencing going 
on. [...] There are a number of pieces here that are important to the narrative for the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty. [...] We [will] have a very, very short window to talk about CTBT. But when we 
believe that we have the right conditions; we will begin to engage the Senate” (Horner et al. 2007). 
Right conditions mean being sure that the Senate majority will vote “yes” (Interview 2010e). 
Another U.S. rejection might pose a risk of many states going nuclear. Moreover, also external 
factors may influence the next debate round on the CTBT: increased confidence in the International 
Monitoring System (mostly after the DPRK 2006 and 2009 nuclear tests), the Stockpile Stewardship 
Program being proved as functioning, an increased number of ratifications and signatory states as 
well as increasing international pressure aiming at “Global Zero”.  
Interestingly overall public opinion does not seem to be taken into account in the CTBT debate, as 
over 70% of American citizens were in favor of the CTBT in 1998 already. The political dynamics 
are more determined by processes within the Republican Party that do not simply respond to overall 
national public opinion on the CTBT in particular. 
 
Summary 
The United States is the first world nuclear power with the most nuclear tests done, sophisticated 
nuclear know-how and record, most modern technology for maintenance of nuclear stockpiles as 
well as the biggest nuclear arsenal worldwide. Due to its position, the United States can play 
however it wants on the CTBT issue. Nevertheless, it has always been clear that rejection of the 
CTBT will diminish Washington’s leadership and moral justification in its international disarmament 
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efforts. The GOP will for sure play CTBT to earn more money into nuclear science and feed all three 
National Nuclear Laboratories, that – unsurprisingly – are located in states with strong Republican 
votes majority. The Obama administration takes the “step-by-step” approach, trying to prepare “the 
ground” for further CTBT talks within the Senate. In order to strengthen his domestic position, the 
President did not permit any remarks abandoning modernization of nuclear stockpiles within the 
2010 NPT Review Conference final document (Interview 2010e).  
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CHAPTER 4. SEARCHING FOR THE COMMON DENOMINATOR 
 
4.1. Summary of findings 
 
The primary aim of this paper was to identify the causal phenomena of the CTBT rejection by the 
nine outstanding hold-out states. The elaboration of arguments and reasons used by the treaty 
opponents and abstainers has been primarily based upon official documents. Governmental 
statements rarely reveal full reasons for states’ reluctance concerning the CTBT, but they outline 
necessary, not to be confused with sufficient, conditions for its entry into force. However, true 
problems hindering states from signing and ratifying the treaty lie deeper. Therefore, they have been 
researched within their historical context, security environment and the potential utility of having 
and/or testing nuclear weapons. The research has been designed using the threefold “level of 
analysis” approach and divided the framework of work into the inter-state, intra-state and individual 
level. A possible theory has been attached to each of them - the realist theory of the anarchical system 
of international relations, neoclassical realist theory and liberalism referring to internal state factors; 
as well as behavioral theories describing peculiarities of individual decision-makers - respectively, as 
giving potential theoretical answers to the research question. A summary of reasoning for all hold-out 
states is being presented in Table 1. Those findings reveal the complexity of the issue and accentuate 
that most rejections are based upon an interrelation of different arguments.  
The classical realist perspective is reflected within the complex regional, security-related 
interdependencies influencing the decision on the CTBT. Two groups of states emerged from the 
research, where the decision on the CTBT relies upon the treaty-related action of other actors. Those 
groups cover the Middle East (Egypt, Israel, Iran) and South-East Asia (China, India, Pakistan). In 
the Middle East, regional power competition and eliminating Israelis’ nuclear capability are major 
reasons for Egypt and Iran hesitating – picturing a classical realists’ balance of power scenario. As 
both officially refrain from developing and thus testing nuclear weapons due to their obligations 
within the NPT regime, their CTBT attitude is connected with the bargaining option for a Middle 
East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone and prompt denuclearization of Israel. And then there is Israel with 
its concerns over its security in the hostile Arab region and struggling with Hamas in Palestine, 
which is being strengthened by Iran. The Israeli security concern is being externalized through a 
deterrence strategy via a clandestine nuclear weapon arsenal. This interdependency presents a vicious 
circle which has to be resolved as a precondition for any arms control treaties in the region. 
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Table 1. State positions on CTBT  
 
State name Official attitude towards CTBT Concerns around CTBT 
 
China (S) 
CTBT endorsement; 
Ratification prepared by Standing 
Committee of the National Parties 
Congress; 
Waiting for U.S. to ratify the CTBT 
Bargain for a „new international security concept“ 
Egypt (S) 
CTBT endorsement 
 
Bargain to denuclearize Israel and include it as a non-
nuclear weapons state into the NPT regime 
Bargain for a ME NWFZ 
Keeping the nuclear option open 
India 
No acceptance for current CTBT text 
“Will not stand in the way, but it should 
be a CTBT which actively contributes to 
nuclear disarmament” 
Bargaining for complete nuclear disarmament 
Loopholes within the test-ban-regime 
Keeping the nuclear option open 
Uncertainty over credibility of previous nuclear tests 
Indonesia (S) CTBT endorsement None – ratification postponed due to political transition 
Iran(S) 
Involvement in the CTBT process but 
without ever officially endorsing it 
Prolonged ratification process 
Western double-standard policies 
Bargain for including Israel as a non-nuclear weapons 
state into the NPT regime 
Keeping the nuclear option open 
Majority of political hard-liners 
Modernization of nuclear weapons 
Israel (S) 
„Firm“ and „unequivocal“ support for 
CTBT 
On-site inspections being too intrusive 
No full readiness of the verification regime 
Struggles in the MESA Group within the Executive 
Council 
Keeping the nuclear option open 
North Korea 
No official statements on CTBT Speculations: 
Securing internal power/power transition 
Testing used to show dissatisfaction 
Keeping the nuclear option open 
Bargaining for better relationship with U.S. 
Bargaining for regional security 
Pakistan 
Not opposed to the CTBT Waiting for India to ratify first 
Bargaining for durable structural security in the region 
– the „Strategic Restraint Regime“ 
Bargaining for better relationship with India 
Loopholes within the test-ban-regime 
U. S. double-standard policies 
Majority of political hard-liners 
Keeping the nuclear option open 
U.S. (S) 
Administration strongly endorses 
CTBT, but needs Senate approval for 
ratification. 
Divided political scene 
No definition of what a „nuclear test“ is 
Questionable effective verification through the IMS 
Maintenance of nuclear weapons security and utility 
without testing 
Development of new nuclear weapons 
(S) – signatory 
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Similar reasoning is to be derived from the Asian case, where it is about the search for stability – a 
classical security dilemma scenario. All Annex-2 hold-out states in the region already possess nuclear 
weapons and made it official by testing. Regional insecurity perceptions are the outcome of territorial 
disputes between states. Transparency, territorial sovereignty acknowledgment and confidence 
building measures would change security perceptions, ensure trust between states and make a 
precondition to consider CTBT.  
The neoclassical realism made an important point in adding internal state affairs as a factor 
explaining the way decisions on foreign politics are being made. The study disclosed that power 
competition is a very important factor on the state level. In the United States the CTBT presents a 
campaign between local priorities and national security interests – an internal power struggle 
between the GOP and the Democrats. Ratification is therefore due to the GOP trying to squeeze the 
Administration for continuous money flow into its electorate states and reluctance to give up nuclear 
testing in general. In North Korea power struggle exists in terms of succession. In this case, testing 
symbolizes power and assures the state leaders ability to rule the country. Nuclear testing is a brand 
new topic for the DPRK and it does not seem to be willing to even talk about a nuclear test ban. 
CTBT has never been mentioned in official statements and the DPRK did not take part in any Article 
XIV Conference as for today. CTBTO made some attempts to attract North Korea, however, 
unsuccessfully (Interview 2010a). As further nuclear tests have been announced, it might be inferred 
that CTBT would only present an obstacle for the regimes plans. Other states face the economic 
factor influencing the CTBT debate with parts of society starting to play a slightly more intense role. 
The Pakistani political scene seems to be more and more divided. However, as for the moment only 
small opposition parties demand a nuclear test ban. The same in case of India, where workers parties 
suggested putting nuclear testing money into the states’ development.  
At the individual level there are no findings made, because the decision on nuclear testing is largely 
collective and influenced by several key political and technocratic voices. Within the given time 
frame and financial resources available for this study, no field analysis could be done which might 
have shed some light on the decision-makers’ personal characteristics. 
In general it is possible to divide all arguments against the CTBT into four categories: 1. technical, 2. 
security-related, 3. arms-control-related and 4. domestic-policy-related (see Table 2.). This, however, 
indicates, that theories proposed at the beginning do not fully explain the research inquiry. The 
distinction is relevant for policy-oriented suggestions. 
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Table 2. Main arguments against CTBT  
 
Technical reasons 
        
· Loopholes within the test-ban-regime (e.g. definition of a 
„nuclear test“) 
Referring to CTBT:  
· Struggles within the MESA Group in the Executive Council  
· Questionable effective verification through the IMS  
· On-site inspections being too intrusive  
· Lack of full readiness of the verification regime  
        
· Maintenance of existing nuclear weapons without testing 
Concerns over credibility of previous nuclear explosions  
Referring to nuclear weapons:  
· Development of new nuclear weapons 
 
Security-related 
arguments 
 
· Nuclear testing as effective deterrent  
· Wish to keep the nuclear option open 
· Signature/ratification relies upon another countries’ steps 
· Bargaining for the Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone  
(ME NWFZ) 
· Bargaining for a better relationship with other countries  
· Bargaining for improved regional security 
Arms-control-related 
reasons 
· Inequality of the international non-proliferation regime  
· Non adherence to international treaties by other states 
· Lack of universality of the NPT  
· Lack of reference towards complete disarmament within the 
CTBT  
Domestic-policy issues 
· Political transition correlated with other priorities  
· Divided political scene  
· Majority of political hard-liners  
· Securing internal power/ securing internal power transition  
· Testing used to show dissatisfaction with other states behaviour 
 
 
Several scientists predict that U.S. ratification could immensely change the course of events. A causal 
chain can be derived from the study showing the interdependency of states decision. The U.S. 
ratification might have a trigger effect, entailing further decisions on ratification by China. The U.S. 
decision, followed by China would influence India and then also Pakistan. By resolving the 
ambivalent Israeli nuclear weapons case, Egypt and – maybe – Iran would follow. Teheran’s 
resistance to ratify the CTBT in that case might give insight into the real purpose of the Iranian 
nuclear program. More persistent opponents might be persuaded to join the treaty after the U.S. 
ratification, as they will see an immense potential for bargaining. If the international community 
could make them a good offer, they might be willing to trade CTBT. However, as the CTBT entry 
into force is related to security issues, it will not be possible to change states decision, if they are not 
convinced to do it. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that any bargaining with CTBT might 
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generally have a weakening effect on voluntary participation in future agreements. 
Further on, states need to be convinced that the “trust” principle build into the treaties entry into 
force mechanism works in favor for them. A joint or regionally-collective signing and ratification 
process may pose not only a confidence building measure between state parties, but overcome 
regional security imbalances that block CTBT ratification. After simultaneously signing and ratifying 
the treaty by e.g. India and Pakistan, their bilateral security balance dilemma will remain. The whole 
security situation for both states, however, will increase. Ad vocem logistics only, signed copies 
might be given to a third state both India and Pakistan trust, so they will be given to the depositary 
only together with both ratification instruments. This approach, though, will most probably not work 
for the Middle East case as Iran does not recognize Israel. However, the same reciprocity principle 
might have some window of opportunity here. The 2012 conference might serve as a platform for 
Egypt, Iran and Israel to talk about reciprocal CTBT ratification as a confidence building measure. A 
logistic principle similar to the one proposed for the Asian case might be used here. For the United 
States and Indonesia there are national level considerations that matter. In the case of the United 
States it is inevitable to work on convincing thirty Senators, who did not have the chance to vote on 
the issue in 1999, to the value added CTBT presents. Indonesia does not seem to have negative 
CTBT related considerations, but needs time to stabilize its internal situation and solve more urgent 
problems before ratifying. Even in a case when North Korea will reject the CTBT, every state party 
to the treaty will gain security rather than lose it. This is due to the fact that North Korea will not 
develop tremendously bigger arsenals endangering its neighbors more than it does today.  
The 2010 NPT Review Conference called all nuclear weapons states to ratify the treaty as being 
mostly responsible for accelerating CTBT’s entry into force (Final Document 2010). Moreover, all 
NPT member states committed to refrain from nuclear test explosions and from the use of new 
nuclear weapons technologies. They also agreed to maintain all existing moratoriums on nuclear 
testing. Accelerated work on the Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone presents a central part of 
this year’s agreement. However, before exploding with naïve exaggeration and hope for a big change 
within the international non-proliferation regime, and the CTBT in particular, one has to bear in mind 
past “promises” and action plans. The 2000 NPT Review Conference with its 13-Steps plan has been 
abandoned by some states and has not been carried out. Nevertheless, the international community is 
obliged to make the CTBT entering into force. NPT article VI demanding each of the parties to the 
treaty to pursue “negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear 
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete 
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disarmament under strict and effective international control” (NPT 1970) is being strengthened by 
the opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1996 on the existing „obligation to pursue in good 
faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under 
strict and effective international control” (International Court of Justice 1996). The international 
norm banning nuclear tests remains fragile as long as the CTBT does not get a legally binding 
dimension.  
At an official event at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Tibor Toth, who serves as the Executive 
Secretary of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization mentioned that the window of opportunity to join the CTBT will not be open 
indefinitely. According to an External Relations and International Cooperation Representative of the 
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, this 
statement means that it is crucial for the CTBT entry into force to use the momentum that has been 
created by President Obama’s famous Prague speech (Obama 2009) in order to accelerate the 
ratification processes (Interview 2010a). It is also related to the Indonesian promise to ratify the 
treaty soon. With time passing by, the U.S.-leverage on other countries will become less. It will be 
tougher and tougher to get North Korea and Iran on the boat (Interview 2010a). 
Important to notice is the idea of a CTBT provisional entry into force, which has been introduced in 
1997 by Wolfgang Hoffmann, who served as Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty Organization (Parachini et.al. 1999:116). The idea is that if most hold-outs ratify the treaty, 
but e.g. one will still refuse it, states may join together in an informal agreement for a provisional 
entry into force – a case tailored for North Korea being the toughest antagonist. However, there are 
no such considerations neither within the CTBTO or the scientific milieu (Interview with an External 
Relations and International Cooperation Representative of the Preparatory Commission for the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, 2010). This alternative entry into force 
procedure would have an overt effect by weakening the incentives to join the CTBT, offering a 
backdoor and thus giving signatory states the feeling of being a “cheap treaty” (Interview 2010a). 
 
4.2. Conclusions 
 
The ratification of the CTBT is in limbo due to nine Annex-2 hold-out states. The treaty negotiation 
and ratification process has encountered increasing disappointment over the international nuclear 
regime, which is seen as being unequal, unfair and not fitting into the reality forty years after it has 
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been commenced. This frustration is loudly expressed within the CTBT debate. However, reasons for 
CTBT refusal also respond to unresolved disputes between the hold-outs. State security and further 
possible nuclear testing concerns pose a stumbling block, creating a vicious circle. Hold-outs will 
consider CTBT for ratification only when perceiving it is in their security interest. The CTBT itself 
does pose a hurdle as it leaves some terms undefined, thus creating loopholes in the texts 
interpretation. The arms control ”market” is a vibrant one and states also use the CTBT to bargain on 
the international scene.  
Restraint is being shown by North Korea which did not comment on the treaty at all. This might be a 
strong indication of further plans for nuclear testing by the regime. It has been already confirmed 
with the 2006 and 2009 nuclear explosions. Iran and Pakistan lack an enthusiastic attitude towards 
the treaty, but do not reject it completely. For the world community the CTBT ratification by Iran 
would act as an immense confidence building measure showing willingness for cooperation. 
Restraint only puts additional doubts on the character of the Iranian nuclear program. Pakistan is 
bound to its security balance with India, which mostly determines its reluctant position.  
CTBT entry into force would clearly be a win-win situation for the whole international community. It 
seems that there are some policy related opportunities for the treaty. US ratification might trigger 
other states to follow. If not voluntarily, a bargaining option might be taken under consideration. 
However, this would need wide international approval as it might endanger incentives for future 
treaty ratification processes. Thus, the primary window of opportunity is building mutual trust within 
regional groupings by using the ‘escrow principle’. 
As for further research, the issue of CTBT as a confidence building instrument between states on the 
basis of neoliberal institutionalism might be of great interest. Technical cooperation, institutional 
framework and political considerations might be explored in order to find out the CTBTs’ impact on 
international cooperation patterns.  
As many obstacles stay in the way to achieve the CTBT prompt entry into force, some scientists 
argue that it might be more effective to concentrate on decreasing nuclear stockpiles first and putting 
CTBT at the end of the path to a sustainable “Global Zero”. This is an interesting idea which shall be 
elaborated in further studies. However, without the CTBT, that was negotiated and gained wide 
international support, no international norm against nuclear testing would emerge so fast. The 
question, therefore, is if the profit and loss balance in terms of the CTBT pays off, if the international 
community has to wait for the Annex-2 hold-outs to sign and/or ratify the treaty.  
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Annex 1 - List of the Annex 2 hold-out states 
 
State  Signature date Ratification date 
China 24 September 1996 - 
Egypt 14 October 1996 - 
India - - 
Indonesia 24 September 1996 - 
Israel 25 September 1996 - 
Iran 24 September 1996 - 
North Korea - - 
Pakistan - - 
United States 24 September 1996 - 
 
 
 
List of Annex 2 states which ratified the treaty: 
 
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, 
Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Viet Nam, 
Zaire.  
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Annex 2 - Comparison of nuclear test explosions numbers  
 
Comparison of the number of nuclear test explosions conducted by the CTBT hold-out states. 
Additionally other NPT nuclear weapon states are mentioned as well. 
 
 
CTBT hold out state Number of nuclear tests 
USA 1032 
China 44 
India 5 
Pakistan 6 
Indonesia 0 
North Korea 2 
Israel ? 
Iran 0 
Egypt 0 
Russia 715 
Great Britain 45 
France 210 
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Annex 3 - Senate Consideration of Major Arms Control and Security Treaties 1972-1999 
 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty/ SALT I (approved 1972) 
• 8 days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings 
• 18 days of Senate floor consideration 
Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (1988) 
• 23 days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings 
• 9 days of Senate floor consideration 
Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (1991) 
• 5 days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings 
• 2 days of Senate floor consideration 
START I Treaty (1992) 
• 19 days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings 
• 5 days of Senate floor consideration 
START II Treaty (1996) 
• 8 days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings 
• 3 days of Senate floor consideration 
Chemical Weapons Convention (1997) 
• 14 days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings 
• 3 days of Senate floor consideration 
NATO Enlargement (1998) 
• 7 days of Foreign Relations Committee hearings 
• 8 days of Senate floor consideration 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (submitted 1997) 
• 1 day of Foreign Relations Committee hearings 
 
 
Source: Hearing IV; Final Review of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (Treaty Doc. 105-28); 
Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate One Hundred Sixth Congress; First 
Session; October 7, 1999; S. Hrg. 106-262; U.S. Government Printing Office; Washington 2000; pp. 81. 
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 Annex 4 - U.S. Presidential safeguards 
 
In August 1995, when President Clinton first announced that the United States would pursue a zero-
yield CTBT, he declared that U.S. adherence would be predicated upon six safeguards:  
 
(A) The conduct of a Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship program [...] to ensure a high level of 
confidence in the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile. 
(B) The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and 
exploratory nuclear technology; 
(C) The maintenance of a basic capability to resume nuclear test activities prohibited by the 
CTBT should the United States cease to be bound to adhere to the Treaty; 
(D) A continued comprehensive research and development program for treaty verification and 
monitoring operations; 
(E) The continued development of a broad range of intelligence gathering and analytical 
capabilities; and 
(F) The understanding that if the President is informed by the Secretaries of Defense and Energy 
as advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of the nuclear weapons 
laboratories, and Commander of U.S Strategic Command that a high level of confidence in 
the safety and reliability of a nuclear weapon type which the two secretaries consider critical 
to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the President, in consultation with the 
Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from  CTBT under the supreme national interest 
clause. 
 
Source: Hearing I; Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations United States Senate One Hundred Fifth Congress, First Sessions; Special Hearing - 
Department of Defense, Department of Energy; October 29, 1997; S. Hrg. 105-480;  U.S. Government 
Printing Office; Washington 1998; pp. 12-13. 
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Annex 5 - Comparison of the 106th and the 111th Senate structure  
106th Senate 
  
111th Senate 
 
In favor 
 
Against Answered 'Present' In favor Against Unknown 
Akaka (D-HI) Abrahan (R-MN) Byrd (D-
WV) 
Akaka (D-HI) Bond (R-MO) Barrasso (RN-
WY) 
Baucus (D-MT) Allard (R-CO) 
  
Baucus (D-MO) Brownback (R-
KS) 
Brown (RN-MS) 
Bayh (D-IN) Ashcroft (R-MO)   Bayh (D-IN) Bunning (KY) Burr (RN-NC) 
Biden (D-DE) Bennett (R-UT) 
  
Begich (DN-AK) Cochran (R-MI) Chambliss (RN-
GA) 
Bingaman (D-
NM) 
Bond (R-MO) 
  
Bennet (DN-CO) Crapo (R-ID) Coburn (RN-
OK) 
Boxer (D-CA) Brownback (R-KS) 
  
Bingaman (D-
NM) 
Grassley (R-IO) Corker (RN-TN) 
Breaux (D-LA) Bunning (R-KY)   Boxer (D-CA) Gregg (R-NH) Cornyn (RN-AR) 
Cleland (D-GA) Burns (R-MO) 
  
Brown (DN-OH) Hutchinson (R-
AR) 
DeMint (RN-SC) 
Conrad (D-ND) Campbell (R-CO)   Burris (DN-IL) Inhofe (R-OK) Ensign (RN-NV) 
Daschle (D-SD) Cochran (R-MI) 
  
Byrd (D-WV) Murkowski (R-
AK) 
Isakson (RN-
GA) 
Dodd (D-CO) Collins (R-ME) 
  
Cantwell (DN-
WA) 
Roberts (R-KS) Johanns (RN-
NE) 
Dorgan (D-ND) Coverdell (R-GA)   Cardin (DN-MD) Sessions (R-AL) Lamar (RN-TN) 
Durbin (D-IL) Craig (R-ID) 
  
Carper (DN-DE) Shelby (R-AL) LeMieux (RN-
FL) 
Edwards (D-NC) Crapo (R-ID) 
  
Casey (DN-PA)   Lieberman (I-
CO) 
Feingold (D-WI) DeWine (R-OH)   Conrad (D-ND)   Risch (RN-ID) 
Feinstein (D-
CA) 
Domenici (R-NM) 
  
Dodd (D-NJ) 
  
Sanders (I-VT) 
Graham (D-FL) Enzi (R-WY)   Dorgan (D-ND)   Thune (RN-SD) 
Harkin (D-IA) Fitzgerald (R-IL)   Durbin (D-IL)   Vitter (RN-LA) 
Hollings (D-SC) Frist (R-TX) 
  
Enzi (R-WY) 
  
Whitehouse 
(DN-RI) 
Inouye (D-HI) Gorton (R-WA)   Feingold (D-WI)   Wicker (RN-MI) 
Johnson (D-SD) Gramm (R-TX)   Feinstein (D-CA)     
Kennedy (D-
MS) 
Grams (R-MA) 
  
Franken (DN-MA) 
    
Kerrey (D-NV) Grassley (R-IA) 
  
Gillibrand (DN-
NY)     
Kerry (D-MS) Gregg (R-NH)   Hagan (DN-NC)     
Kohl (D-WI) Hagel (R-NE)   Harkin (D-IO)     
Landrieu (D-LA) Hatch (R-UT)   Inouye (D-HI)     
Lautenberg (D-
NJ) 
Helms (R-NC) 
  
Johnson (DN-SD) 
    
Leahy (D-VT) Hutchinson (R-AR) 
  
Kaufman (DN-
DE)     
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106th Senate 111th Senate 
In favor Against Answered 'Present' In favor Against Unknown 
Levin (D-MN) Hutchinson (R-TX)   Kerry (D-MS)     
Lieberman (D-
CO) 
Inhofe (R-OK) 
  
Klobuchar (DN-
MA)     
Lincoln (D-AZ) Kyl (R-AZ)   Kohl (D-WI)     
Mikulski (D-
MD) 
Lott (R-MI) 
  
Landrieu (D-LA) 
    
Moynihan (D-
NJ) 
Lugar (R-IN) 
  
Lautenberg (D-
NJ)     
Murray (D-WA) Mack (R-FL)   Leahy (D-VT)     
Reed (D-RI) McCain (R-AZ)   Levin (D-MN)     
Reid (D-NV) McConnell (R-KY)   Lincoln (D-AR)     
Robb (D-VI) Murkowski (R-
AK)   
McCaskill (DN-
MO)     
Rockefeller IV 
(D-WV) 
Nickles (R-OK) 
  
Menendez (DN-
NJ)     
Sarbanes (D-
MD) 
Roberts (R-KS) 
  
Merkley (DN-OR) 
    
Schumer (D-NJ) Roth (R-DE)   Mikulski (D-MD)     
Torricelli (D-NJ) Santorum (R-PA)   Murray (D-DC)     
Wellstone (D-
MA) 
Sessions (R-AL) 
  
Nelson (DN-FL) 
    
Wyden (D-OR) Shelby (R-AL)   Nelson (DN-NE)     
1 Independent Smith (R-NH)   Pryor (DN-AR)     
Bryan (R-NV) Snowe (R-ME)   Reed (D-RI)     
Chafee (R-RI) Stevens (R-AK)   Reid (D-NV)     
Jeffords (R-VT) Thomas (R-WY) 
  
Rockefeller (DN-
WV)     
Smith (R-OR) Thomson (R-TX) 
  
Schumer (DN-
NY)     
Specter (R-PA) Thurmond (R-SC) 
  
Shaheen (DN-NH) 
    
  Voinowich (R-OH) 
  
Specter (DN-PA) 
    
  Warner (R-VA) 
  
Stabenow (DN-
MN)     
      Tester (DN-MO)     
      Udall (DN-CO)     
      Udall (DN-NM)     
      Warner  (DN-VI)     
      Webb (DN-VI)     
      Wyden (D-OR)     
      McCain (R-AZ)     
      Snowe (R-ME)     
      Collins (R-ME)     
      Bennett (R-UT)     
      Hatch (R-UT)     
      Lugar (R-IN)     
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Sources:  
Closing Remarks of Debate and Roll Call Vote on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Page S12548, 
Congressional Record – 106th Congress; October 13, 1999; online available at 
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/text/101399ctbtvote.htm (downloaded 15 July 2010). 
Dunlop, Sean; Preez du, Jean; The United States and the CTBT: Renewed Hop or Politics as Usual?; James 
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute for International Studies; 
February 2009. 
 
(RN-XX) or (DN-XX) - the letter “N” which appears after the party names (D-Democrats, R-
Republicans) indicates that it is the first term of the particular Senator in the Senate, which means 
that he/she did not take part in the 1999 CTBT voting. 
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List of Abbreviations 
ABC Weapons of Mass Destruction (Atomic, Biological, Chemical) 
BWC Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
CD Conference on Disarmament 
CFE Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention 
DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
EIF Entry Into Force 
FMCT Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GOP Grand Old Party (U.S. Republican Party) 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
INF Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces 
IMS International Monitoring System 
ME NWFZ Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone 
MESA Middle East and South Asia  
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NGO Non-Governmental Organization 
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
PL People's Liberation Army 
PRC People's Republic of China 
PTBT Partial Test Ban Treaty 
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 
SSP Stockpile Stewardship Program 
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty  
TNT Trinitrotoluene 
U.S. United States 
UN United Nations 
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
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